“I enjoy all types of music, but the music of my own flesh and blood goes right to my heart.”
—Nelson Mandela, Long Walk To Freedom (1994)

Definitions of Definition

What does it mean “to be”? I feel as though I exist as I write these words; it seems as though there is a table at which I sit, and a glass of water to my side. What does it mean for an object to be a table, or a glass, or water, or me? What does it mean to be an object?

The identitarian project takes as a foundation a particular answer to these questions, as they relate to being human: to be human is to be a composite of an array of innate, permanent characteristics, such as one’s birthplace, ancestry, skin colour, gender, sexuality, and less commonly other such characteristics. This theory has much in common with the concept of a “natural kind” [a grouping that reflects the structure of the natural world rather than the interests and actions of human beings, SEP]. Though there is much debate in philosophy over whether natural kinds exist at all, let alone as biological or social categories, what is of relevance to identitarianism for the moment is that identitarians act as though there are such natural kinds, that essential human traits fall into that category, and that these traits are the primary bases of which being is composed.

We can break down definition into three basic types. These are often treated by binary thinkers as if only one can be true, and the others rejected. Scalar thinkers will recognise immediately that each will have its uses in different contexts, even for the same term.

Intension: Descriptions of the properties of a class of things. Are you describing what a thing or class is in words, with a phrase or group of phrases? If so, then you are probably defining ‘definition’ intensionally. For example, 'a bachelor' is “an unmarried man”. This is especially well-suited to abstract concepts or words that are short-hands.
Extension: Referring directly to the set of entities in a class of things. Are you pointing at or listing examples of a thing or class in order to explain what they are? If so, then you are probably defining ‘definition’ extensionally. This is especially well-suited to concrete entities, especially those with vague definitions.
Natural kinds: These are primarily physical scientific categories such as molecules or species. In my view, these are best understood as patterns in the structures of types of entity.

Identitarianism is a fractured creed. Imagine a group of them in a room together: they all agree that identities exist and that identities impart moral status, but they have no agreement on which identities exist, how identities are defined, how an ontological identity imparts a moral status, or which moral status is imparted by which identity. And then, non-identitarians also have views on these natural kinds, which sometimes overlap with identitarian views, but are frequently very different. I have observed five key families of stance about the natural kinds essentialism (NKE) viewpoint. [Not philosophical stances: stances among the general population.] These are: intensional; spiritual; idealist; structural; functional.

Intensional essentialism: An individual y belongs to a natural kind x because for all (or sufficient) traits, if y has those traits, then y is a member of x. By itself this is quite a primitivist, naturalistic viewpoint, and tends to be held by low-information identitarians and non-identitarians alike.
Spiritual essentialism: y belongs to x because y's spiritual essence is that of x. This is a religious or woo-woo view. It is again very primitive, characteristic of low-information, and currently skews towards the left of the identitarian spectrum, though certainly many right identitarians have been such woo-woo spiritualists too.
Idealist essentialism: y belongs to x because y asserts that y is x. This view represents the triumph of the will. In former times this was a far-right position, opposed to the materialism of the left. Today it is almost exclusively a left-identitarian position.
Structural essentialism: y belongs to x because y's molecular structure is characteristic of that of the set x. In philosophy of language, this is broadly the view of natural kinds held by Kripke and Putnam (though theirs is more convoluted as they are academic philosophers), and it is also the view of natural kinds to which I primarily subscribe from a formal perspective. (Every philosopher of language must have a view of natural kinds: this does not imply support for basing ontology on them.) This is not very commonly held by the furthest-left identitarians, who tend to be philosophical idealists, but becomes increasingly common as one edges up the scale towards right identitarians.
Functional essentialism: y belongs to x because it is useful for us to describe y as belonging to x. This is generally just pragmatic good sense. When limited to natural kinds, I endorse this view alongside structural essentialism: the patterns we identify in natural kinds' structures are chosen because they correspond to macro-traits that it is useful for us to distinguish between. (Again, this linguistic stance on natural kinds does not imply support for basing ontology on them.)

In practice, multiple of these arguments are often deployed simultaneously, regardless of context and regardless of contradiction, in a fuzzy barrage of bestial illogic that seems intended to overwhelm rather than to prove.

As suggested in the list, the most obvious, primitive way to define a natural kind is through an intensional characteristic, yet most of these traits are contingent. Of course there is nothing in practice stopping identitarians from defining their group using primitive intensional characteristics. Thus we have the “true Scotsmen”, who eat haggis and wear kilts and quote Burns and vote SNP. Likewise “true women” who are consensual and liberal (as many feminists suggest the world would be if it were run by women), “true gay men” who mince or have radical politics, etc. These contingent traits however are unsustainable as the basis for natural kinds: they always face the problem of their failure to correspond to reality. These “true x” definitions are used because they are useful to someone, and so parallel words are coined, or sometimes the core word is used ambiguously to define the subset. But they are not able to sustain preëminence as a definition of the broad natural kind.

Natural kinds can also be explored through an aretaic hybrid of intension and extension: a virtue ontology. We can see this in the importance placed in identitarian culture on lists of great individuals from one's demographic. There are countless lists online of "great blacks" and "great women" and "great this that and the other". The principle underlying it is that, as the individual writing or reading the list shares an essential characteristic with the great individual, they must therefore also share the great individual's other characteristics, which made them great, because essential characteristics create the rest of one's being and reality. So for example, because Julius Caesar and Alexander the Great were brilliant and successful bisexual men, other bisexual men could be (weak essentialism) or must be (strong essentialism) brilliant and successful as well.

The paradigm cases of such traits then are invariant, exclusive, and real. Invariant: every member of the set has the trait and cannot not have—they must have—the trait. Exclusive: only members of the set have the trait. Real: the trait is measurable, specific, and ideally physical. We could say of structural essence that it simply picks one such intensional characteristic—pattern in molecular structure—and declares without sufficient justification that that intensional characteristic and that one alone is the valid ground for defining a natural kind. I think this is only a valid critique if one insists on thinking binarily: accepting structure as a basis for natural kind reference does not preclude using other forms of reference for other terms, or even for the same terms in other, non-natural kind contexts. This is likewise the response to criticisms that this model allows for multiple patterns to be found (good, and of course: we use the patterns that are useful to us) and that these patterns often have hazy edges (so what, the patterns hold well enough for them to be useful to us).

Location at a given point in time (for these purposes, usually at birth or in the present) is, by the laws of physics, an invariant, exclusive, real characteristic: you were either born in Identiland or you weren't; you either live in Identiland or you don't. So that is not a primitive intensional argument, whereby you include all sorts of contingent characteristics like "eats the same food as Identilanders", "wears the same clothes as Identilanders", etc. Really it is a natural kinds-style argument, in that it relies on an invariant, exclusive, real type of intensional characteristic. As such, location has been a major source of identitarian focus throughout history. We will see that other quasi-natural kinds can be adduced as essences when they likewise behave like them.

Essential Essences

The importance of this idea of natural kinds, of essential characteristics, is evident from the type of categories that are in practice used as the primary bases of identity. The two most important categories of identity—race and gender—are mostly-rigid characteristics that cannot be changed, because they relate to one’s DNA (albeit, in both cases, a very small part of it, and for race, in a fuzzy way consistent with structural natural kinds). These differences are then interpreted as major discrete groupings.

It is important to realise that identitarianism is not only a left- or right-wing phenomenon. Rather there is a classic doublethink operation, where partisans loudly and symmetrically attack each other for being so focussed on identity. Historically, a combination of extreme power differentials and limited communication technology meant that only dominant identities could be exercised, especially those focussed on a local, self-sustaining community. Today more previously subservient or submerged identities have emerged, but they are all united by adherence to the doctrine that essence-as-identity is the real and proper (i.e. descriptive and prescriptive) foundation of socio-political organisation. This principle of essentialism makes for (and explains) some interesting divisions among identitarians. This division is also important for reminding us that individuals, even from within the identitarian spectrum, will disagree vigorously about whether certain identities are valid or exist at all. From a philosophical perspective, I think it best to take a broad view of the whole spectrum of identity, especially as edge cases are often the most useful for helping us to identify and test our theories on a subject.

Location vs Inheritance (Race / Ethnicity / Family)

A rigid designator that applies to an individual is their location, and location seems to be a constant of identity throughout history. Location, especially at birth or at a particular time, is fixed and specific. The rigidity of location as an essential characteristic is what allows for civic nationalism as a less controversial nationalist platform than racial nationalism. But which location? Location of birth is often used as a criterion for automatic legal citizenship, and for moral citizenship. Current location is also used, be that location of residence or location of significant ownership. For right identitarians these factual definitions are the basis for their identitarianism, but this is not sufficient for the left.

A few years ago, Google ran an advertising campaign which posed the question, "What is Britishness?". The answer that Google gave was to show lots of photos of black and Asian celebrities, most notably a Somali athlete, resident in America, who registered himself as British because he could get better funding from Britain than from Somalia, but who was often held up by progressives as being the quintessential exemplar of British culture. Mohamed Farah, the Somali athlete in question, is on the frontline of the philosophical problem of national identity. He wasn't born in Britain. He doesn't live in Britain. He has no British ancestry. He is not fluent in English. He does not follow a traditionally British religion (Islam). He is known to be personally unpopular with other British athletes. Relative to his level of success (he has held all of the Olympic, World and European gold medals in both the 5,000m and 10,000m male running events), he has been one of the least popular athletes in Britain, always scoring aberrantly low in popularity polls.

But he considers himself to be British (or claims as much anyway, which is all we can go on in that regard), and therefore his claim to Britishness is ferociously defended by left identitarians. This is not an intensional Britishness of traits, or a locative Britishness of place, or a structural Britishness of genetic patterns. It is also not really spiritual, because that would imply invariance, whereas I don't think anyone believes that Farah had a British soul as a child in Somalia. It is partly a pragmatic Britishness—there is cynical utility in allowing a champion athlete to pretend to be British—but the defence is more sincere than that. This is an idealist Britishness of the will. He has declared himself British, and that assertion of will is sufficient to restructure the world around him. The basis of the left's civic nationalism is not location, but the triumph of the will.

There is therefore a fundamental clash between these two groups, both of which broadly accept the premiss that location is a valid socio-political basis. On one side, realists, who look to material grounds for rooting their identity; on the other, idealists, who root their identity in the power of their assertions. This is not even considering those who believe that other identities should be paramount, or even those who believe that identity would not be paramount in a utopian “kingdom of ends” at all. This is an unbridgeable divide between those who agree on the primacy of location. This explains the bitter conflict between the two camps. Yes, tribalism is a factor too, but it is tribal division arising from a real divide.

Closely related to location is inheritance. Low historical levels of transportation technology, and aids in adapting to counter-evolutionary environments, meant that for the most part, location and inheritance were highly correlated. But inheritance holds socio-political advantages and disadvantages relative to location. Among its disadvantages, it is a much fuzzier trait, and the fuzziness increases with the scale of the difference. This is both unhelpful and helpful: unhelpful because it becomes less accurate the more we would want to use it; helpful because the increased difference counteracts the reduced accuracy. Another disadvantage for some is that it makes it more difficult to maintain cohesion in a multi-ethnic society—but this is really an argument against multi-culturalism.

The main advantage of inheritance as a basis is that it is emotionally satisfying to the bestial nature inherent in all humans. Tangible affinity—looks, sounds, smells, etc—appears to be innate in all animal species, presumably as a survival mechanism for genes. Genetic patterns that select for affinity for themselves will ceteris paribus outcompete genetic patterns that do not. This may well be irrelevant in a naïve “Kingdom of Ends” utopia, but in the real world it has real implications that cannot be ignored without consequence. The most significant for this discussion is that this descriptive reality voids the prescriptive disadvantages: if p is false, then it doesn't matter whether or not p would be useful or moral in a world where it were true.

Sex vs Gender

For sex / gender, the realist-idealist conflict has resulted in some tortuous specialisation of terminology. This different terminology is supposed to make the cases clearer, but unwitting and intentional misuse of and disagreement over the terms all result in more confusion and conflict. A brief précis of how I tend to understand the terms:

Sex: Biological status. Either structurally via chromosomes, or intensionally via possession (at birth) of functioning genitalia associated with males or females. These two groups cover around 99.9% of live human births, and an even higher proportion of functioning members of human society. The term is medieval in English, meaning a division (like “section”).
Gender: Social or psychological status. Many superficial intensional traits are linked to gender rather than sex. Traditionally, and still for most folks, gender and sex mapped fairly equally onto each other, with biological males treated as and thinking of themselves as social males, and vice versa. This started to change as “sex” gained erotic associations, and then feminists wanted to distinguish between the biological and social traits associated with sex/gender. The term is also medieval in English, meaning a type or kind (like “genre”).
Trans-: The state of being somehow a different sex or gender than would otherwise be expected. What can this actually mean other than a vague, meaningless aspiration? That will be covered in my forthcoming piece on trans-sexual metaphysics.
“Cis”-: The opposite of trans-, i.e. normal folks. Despite the supposed cultural norm of allowing folks to self-identify, this word has been imposed on this group externally. Not that this is a great problem in itself—if there are to be trans individuals (itself debatable), then there needs to be a term for their antithesis, and this one is as good as any—but this act exposes the fundamental falseness and hypocrisy of progressives' claimed desire to avoid both oppression and the causing of offence.

Used consistently, joining the terms gives us “trans-sex(ual)” (and “cis-sex(ual)”), meaning a change (or continuation) in biological status; and “trans-gender” (and “cis-gender”), meaning a change (or continuation) in social status. I will tend to use the terms in this manner.

These divisions are in theory useful (the former more than the latter) for distinguishing between elements that are different in ways that are important to us. For example, it is useful to distinguish between those traits that are innate or near-universal to females by virtue of their biology, and those traits that are contingent upon social conditions, because the latter can be changed more easily, should that be desired. The slight changes from historical usage are not problems per se: words change constantly to reflect social need.

Additionally, biological sex in particular is a useful trait for an animal society engaged in asymmetric sexual reproduction to differentiate on. Whatever one may think about the tendencies exhibited by females and males—even if the supposed tendencies towards female empathy, male spatial awareness, etc, are real, they might be biological or social—either way there are some traits that are both biological and important in such a society. In particular, conception: only biologically female bodies can carry and birth offspring.¹

Sex and gender can be seen as crystallising the two main philosophical positions on natural kinds, structural and intensional. Gender, in this reading, is certainly intensional, as it covers socio-psychological traits like empathy or spatial awareness. Even if these are ultimately biologically influenced or even determined, we interpret them intensionally, as traits. Sex is slightly more ambiguous. In modern times it has become customary to associate sex with chromosomes², but sex is also used to refer to basic biological traits, especially genitals. Genes are firmly structural, but genitals are intensional. So “sex” is used ambiguously with regard to type of reference.

The spiritual and idealist approaches to identity map even less neatly onto the sex / gender binary. Both are conceived of as innate and immovable, suggesting that they are not part of the contingent social trait definition of “gender”, but they can also exist in sharp contradiction to the firmly material connotation of “sex”. This leads us to the thorny problem of trans-sexuality. A would-be trans-woman: still has an XY sex chromosome pair; is still susceptible to male illnesses; can never conceive; has experienced society as a male; but considers themself to be female, and acts in some ways that could be considered female. (And the same applies in reverse for would-be trans-men.)

Unlike for sex/gender itself, trans status is not at all structural³, even though structural essence is, I would say, the valid way of defining a natural kind. What’s more, pro-trans identitarians are not generally satisfied with the functional argument that a would-be trans-sexual is to be referred to as their preferred sex only out of polite respect for their choice: instead, the would-be trans-sexual is strongly asserted to be really and truly their preferred sex. The popular claim is that “trans-women are women”, not merely that “trans-women should be treated as women”, and polite pragmatists, such as JK Rowling, are ferociously cancelled.

It is also difficult to describe this as intensional, based on attributes, because so many of the real traits of the would-be trans-sexual are still those generally associated with their structural sex. Even within those traits, the more concrete the traits are—bodily organs, procreation, disease susceptibility—the less plausible they are as trans traits. The traits relied on by trans activists, for example in the ubiquitous “I knew my trans-daughter was trans because she liked...” lists, tend to be the most superficial—wearing dresses, playing with dolls, etc.

Trans status is then one of the two remaining options. Either it is a spiritual essence—the idea that, regardless of the material evidence, this individual is female “inside”; or, it is an idealist essence—an essence of the will, where the individual reforms the world around them with their mind. This drastic ontological difference, between how trans activists are obliged to view their identity (since the other options are unavailable to them, given their defining prior ontological commitments) and how many traditional feminists have viewed their identity, is at the heart of the conflict between trans activists and so-called “TERFs”.

Sexuality

Another important example of the primacy of essence in identitarianism is the importance that most identitarians place, from both pro- and anti- directions, on whether homosexuality is innate or a choice. From a standpoint that was liberal but objective, it should not make any difference whether homosexuality was innate or a choice: it doesn't cause anyone direct harm other than nebulous harms of "offence" and "discomfort". But if homosexuality were a choice, then it would be harder to fit it into an essentialist schema, and if it could not be fitted into an essentialist schema then it would not be an appropriate category of identity. Parallelling this, conservative identitarians, who value their identity as heterosexual and often also their religious identity (see below), need for homosexuality to be a choice so that they can reject it from within their essentialist ontology. It is not enough for them simply to cite ills they suppose to be associated with homosexuality, because their prior commitment to essentialism obliges them to pay at least token respect to essential traits.

Probably because homosexuality is more precariously placed as an essence, as discussed above, its advocates tend to steer clear from the idealist model⁴. As before, identitarian advocates also do not countenance the functional model, whereby homosexuality is essential only insofar as it is useful for us to describe it as such. After all, the identitarian model of politics, which uses the essentialist theory of being as one of its bases, demands special privileges based on essences, on the basis that they are fundamental to individuality.

Queer activists often place high priority on structural essence, the idea that sexuality is determined by one's genes. This might seem odd, given that there is very little factual evidence for a clear genetic or evolutionary basis for homosexuality at all. However, the motive becomes clear once one understand the essentialist theory of being that underlies identitarian politics. Because homosexuality is harder to affirm as being innate, since sexual orientation is fluid across a lifetime, it becomes more important to emphasise the most concrete measures of essence. In its own way, this tendency by queer activists is an affirmation of the primacy of the structural model of essence. The identitarians are aware that structural essence is the gold standard for natural kinds, and though they will use other measures where that seems more convenient, when pressed they return to structural essence.

The remaining two types of essence are used sporadically. Intensional essence used to be popular with low-information identitarians, and many homosexuals and heterosexuals still identify in practice as having very different interests and behaviours. But now, the former tales of “I knew my son was gay because he liked dolls instead of football” have become “I knew my trans-daughter was trans because she liked dolls instead of football”. As the fashion has changed, as trans-sexual children have become liberal parents' trendy accessory instead of gay children, so has the emphasis on intension over structure.

Spiritual essence is not much used directly for sexuality in modern society, as those who prioritise their heterosexual identity tend to believe heterosexuality to be universal, and those who prioritise their homosexual identity tend to be atheists. However, it is implicit in thoughts about the spiritual process of reïncarnation: when considering who one will love in a future life, one imagines a partner of the same sex that one is attracted to in life. (The mentally ill individuals who believe themselves to be “multiple systems” [see Otherkin below] also often ascribe a distinct sexual orientation to each of their residents, though this may be more to do with the fetishistic nature of their mental illness.)

It is worth mentioning here the intra-identitarian debate over whether identity of sexuality is actually a form of identity of gender. This is distinct from the usual dismissal of whether an identity axis is valid, because it recognises sexuality as essential, but only as part of the gender essence.⁵ This debate comes from both sides. On one side, conservative and religious identitarians often believe that sexual orientation is properly a trait of biological sex, whereby females are oriented towards males and vice versa. On the other, some feminists believe that sexual orientation is only relevant because of that conservative / religious viewpoint. This is interesting in this discussion because it relates to the views of essence adopted by the two groups: both tend to view sex as structural but differently causal, conservatives to suggest that the fixed structure of sex determines sexuality (or ought to), and this subset of feminists to suggest that the fixed structure of sex is all that matters, so contingent traits, such as sexuality, are less important.

Otherkin

Having mentioned Otherkin, who may not be familiar to all readers⁶, I will proceed to discuss them briefly here. Bluntly, some individuals claim to believe themselves to be of species other than human, including species that are not real. Generally, individuals who claim to be something they are patently not are either attention-seekers or mentally ill, and otherkin are no exception. As such, this group is not widely accepted by other identitarians, but as discussed at the outset, this is not really important: they believe themselves to have this identity, and they tend to strongly support other forms of identitarianism as well, even if that support is not (yet) widely reciprocated. Their terminology and theories are extremely varied to the point of incoherence, but they can broadly be classed as follows:

Therians / Animalkin: Individuals who believe they are actually animals, commonly wolves and generally other charismatic megafauna.
Otherkin(-proper): Individuals who believe they are actually of a fictional species, commonly dragons and elves.
Fictives / Fictionkin: Individuals who believe that they are actually a specific fictional character, commonly from Japanese anime.
Multiple systems / Polykin: Individuals who believe that they are actually lots of different entities somehow existing simultaneously in one body.

The otherkin pathology has arisen alongside the growth spurt of identity politics in general, because it takes those claims at their word, and to their inevitable conclusion. If a biological male can actually be female, be that through surface traits, spiritual nature, or bald assertion, then why can a human not be a wolf, or a dragon, or Naruto? Once one accepts the trans-sexual argument, or even accepts the identity argument in any form other than purely structural natural kinds, there is no logical reason to reject the claims of the otherkin. The case is obviously strongest for animals, but even for, say, dragons: if there are unseen souls that exist distinctly in human bodies, and these souls need not relate in their essences to those human bodies, then what ground has the spiritualist identitarian to argue that there are no souls available that are of essences that they have not seen? I, of course, would argue that this is the Principle of Explosion working its brutal and inexorable logic on the flawed assumptions of non-structural essentialism.

Looking directly at otherkin essences, although there are a few otherkin who claim to be genetically of their other kind, this is, like the equivalent for trans-sexuals, mostly a grievous failure on the part of the education system rather than any systematic theory. Banal intensional essence is popular, at least as a supposed evidence base (e.g., “I must be a fishkin because I like swimming”), and spiritual essentialism is, as discussed, very widely accepted as a necessary part of otherkin ontology.

However, it is interesting to note that otherkin also make significant use of both idealist and functional essentialism. This is a fascinating contrast to the reaction of homosexual activists to their tentative natural kind status, where they insist, against evidence, on a structural, genetic basis. Otherkin who wish to avoid spiritualist woo-woo do not even have the option of claiming structural essence plausibly available to them (what would it even mean to have “dragon DNA”, let alone before moving to the inorganic otherkin, such as stonekin or voidkin?), and must thus retreat into more defiant territory. One can find otherkin who believe they are otherkin because they assert themselves to be so, and otherkin who say, of their own identity, that it is not real as such, but a functional status that they find useful because they enjoy it.

Age

A welcome return to a rigid designator after our increasingly wild detour, age is another non-structural invariant, exclusive characteristic. Like location, it is indexed to a fact about how you relate to reality. No matter what you may wish, you were born x days ago. Age is also useful as an identity criterion because it correlates strongly to traits that are importantly useful for us to distinguish between, that is, old folk behave differently to young folk, and have different physical characteristics, in ways that are non-deterministic but strongly correlated.

Again like location, there is no purely structural way to understand it—age is not a natural kind. Nor can one plausibly assert oneself to be a different age any more than I can assert myself to be currently on Mars.⁷. Nor does age seem particularly a quality of spirit, though depictions of ghosts of children often have them continue to act and think childishly, even if they have been ghosts for many years, and should therefore have been continuing to develop their faculties.

No, age is an intensional essence of the special kind that is rigid at any given moment, like location.⁸ This might change in the future if space-travel takes off, though. Time progresses more slowly at relativistic speeds, and progresses faster far from gravity wells. Could a child qualify for a pension, or be legally married, if they are put onto a spaceship travelling near the speed of light for a while? As with much else, our societies will need to adapt to changing technological capability.

Wealth vs Class

Wealth and class can be thought of as like sex and gender: an invariant material characteristic that non-deterministically informs a set of social traits. Wealth itself is a material trait that cannot be changed instantly. Class has two main meanings: first, the “set of traits” meaning analogous to gender, which is how the word is popularly used; and a family of meanings in post-Marxian sociology, perhaps the clearest of which is that class is about the individual's relationship to the means of production, primarily ownership of them (capitalists), management of them (bourgeoisie), use of them (proletariat), or parasitism of them (lumpen).

As an identity, these elements are hybridised into what one might call “poorism”: the fetishisation and glorification of poverty and the cultures it produces. There is a pervasive belief that the poor live lives that are somehow more “authentic”, a word with powerful essentialist connotations. The popular image of the happy poor and the miserable rich is belied by every piece of research and survey data that demonstrates time and again that the rich are consistently happier than the poor, yet this entirely intuitive finding is somehow denied by popular culture. Instead, a Nietzschean Sklavenmoral of passivity and low quality is reified into an “identity” and placed at the centre of ontology. It is important to note that the essentialist theory of being characteristic of the identity model of society is so closely tied to Sklavenmoral, and hence to the palatabilist theory of truth. This is why the identity model of society has become more prevalent as technology has pushed the secular cycle beyond its normal limits, with a surfeit of population skewing culture towards Sklavenmoral. It is also why it is so much more prevalent among groups that have been historically weak. Even in the early stages of identity politics, it was not coincidental that early twentieth-century nationalism found more fertile soil in the second-rate empires of Italy, Germany, and Spain than in the superpowers of Britain and France.

(Dis-)Ability

By ability, I mean physical, mental, and emotional disability, which is another commonly cited identity or “protected characteristic”. These can often be structural, if they are from a genetic cause, but even when they are not structural they are generally invariant designators: an amputee can't grow new legs. For our immediate purposes examining how they relate to the essentialist theory of being, there is an interesting division between physical and emotional disability that mirrors what we have observed before (with mental disability somewhere inbetween). Because physical disability is visible and obviously invariant, especially over short periods, its advocates do not tend to need to discuss its validity as a site of identity. Emotional health is however not invariant—it can recover sharply, or with sufficient extrinsic motivation. As such, emotional health activists are very vocal about their disability being supposedly invariant: usually to do with their genes, or their biochemistry; at a bare minimum, “I can't help it”. Yet there is very little direct evidence that any given emotional disability is caused by a given genetic structure or biochemical reality, and every theory that is mooted is promptly disproved, with the serotonin theory of depression the most significant recent casualty. Despite this, emotional health identitarians are unambiguous in placing the blame for their suffering on invariant traits.

This will become more important when we examine the palatabilist theory of truth and Sklavenmoral in more detail as they relate to the identity model of society. For now, it is significant, like with homosexuality, that the more tentative essential nature of emotional disability leads to a defensive emphasis on unproven and spurious structural explanations, in order to justify its status as an essence, and thus its position in the social order of identity.

Religion

Is religion an identity? For the religious, they often experience their religion as an absolute of their existence, that they could not change even should they want to. Many atheists and agnostics disagree: many of those who have never had a religion don't understand why a religion could inspire such feelings in the first place; many of those who abandoned their religion think that everyone has a choice about it in the same way that they did. There are two important exceptions to this trend: some religions are explicitly racially based (i.e. racist), such as Judaism, and others that are not explicitly racially based have strong connections to a particular ethnicity, such as Islam to Arabs⁸; and left identitarians, influenced by palatabilism and Sklavenmoral, treat any “oppressed” and/or exotic religions as being valid identities, but are unwilling to make the same allowance for “oppressor” or domestic religions. The case is also complicated by the legacy of the European Wars of Religion, which were resolved by making personal religious choice out of bounds for public policy.

Religion, precisely by being an outlier case, helps to make clear some of the dividing lines over essentialism. Those who see identity as being about structural natural kinds, or at least invariant, exclusive, real characteristics, get baffled that anyone would even consider religion an identity. Those who see identity as being about spirits, or idealism, or even just functionality, can understand religion as a basis for identity. And this is why a widespread understanding of the essentialist theory of being is essential for understanding identity politics. Once you understand that identity is about essences, and the five main types, most other problems of identity resolve themselves.

sum θoətiz abaʊt ðiiy esenʃəlist θiəriiy ov biiyiŋ [wip]

“miiʸ enjoiʸ oəl taipiz ov myʊʊzik, but ðə myʊʊzik ov miis oʊn fleʃ and blud goʊ rait tə miis haət.”
—nelsən mandelə, loŋ wʊək tə friidəm (1994)

definiʃəniz ov definiʃən

kwes it miin wot “tə bii”? mii fiil az ðoʊ miiʸ egzist az mii rait ðiiz wuədiz; ðeə siim az ðoʊ ðeə biiʸ a teibəl at wic mii sit, and a glas ov wʊətə tə miis said. kwes it miin wot foəʳ an objekt tə biiʸ a teibəl, oəʳ a glas, oə wʊətər, oə mii? kwes it miin wot tə biiʸ an objekt?

ðiiʸ aidentiteəriiən projekt teik az a faʊndeiʃən a patikyələʳ ansə tə ðiiz kwescəniz, az dii rileit tə biiyiŋᵍ hyʊʊmən: tə bii hyʊʊmən bii tə biiʸ a kompozit ov an areiʸ ov ineit, puəmənənt karaktəristikiz, suc az um-iis buəθ-pleis, ansestrii, skin kulə, jendə, sekʃʊʊwalitiiʸ, and les komənliiʸ uðə suc karaktəristikiz. ðis θiərii hav muc in komən wið ðə konsept ov a “nacərəl kaind” [a grʊʊpiŋ ðat riflekt ðə strukcəʳ ov ðə nacərəl wuəld raəðə ðan ðiiy intrestiz and akʃəniz ov hyʊʊmən biiyiŋᵍiz, s.e.f.]. ðoʊ ðeə bii muc dibeit in filosəfiiʸ oʊvə weðə nacərəl kaindiz egzist at oəl, let aloʊn az baiyəlojikəl oə soʊʃəl katəgəriiyizyiz, wot biiʸ ov relevəns tʊʊʷ aidentiteəriiənizəm foə ðə moʊmənt bii ðat aidentiteəriiəniz akt az ðoʊ ðeə bii suc nacərəl kaindiz, ðat esenʃəl hyʊʊmən treitiz foəl intə ðat katəgəriiʸ, and ðat ðiiz treitiz bii ðə praimərii beisisiz ov wic biiyiŋ bii kəmpoʊzəð.

wii kan breik daʊn definiʃən intə tii beisik taipiz. ðiiz biiʸ oftən triitəð bai bainərii θinkəriz az if oʊnliiʸ um kan bii trʊʊʷ, and ðiiʸ uðəriz rijektəð. skeilə θinkəriz wil rekəgnaiz imiidiiyətlii ðat iic wil hav itiis yʊʊsiz in difrənt kontekstiz, iivən foə ðə seim tuəm.

intenʃən: diskripʃəniz ov ðə propətiiyiz ov a klas ov θiŋᵍiz. kwes yii bii diskraibiŋᵍ wot a θiŋᵍ oə klas biiʸ in wuədiz, wið a freiz oə grʊʊp ov freiziz? if soʊ, ðen probəblii ðii bii difainiŋ ‘definiʃən’ intenʃənəlii. foəʳ egzampəl, 'a bacelə' biiʸ “an un-mariiyəð man”. ðis biiʸ espeʃəlii wel-sʊʊtəð tʊʊw abstrakt konseptiz oə wuədiz ðat bii ʃʊət-handiz.
ekstenʃən: rifuəriŋ dairektlii tə ðə set ov entitiiyiz in a klas ov θiŋᵍiz. kwes ðii bii pointiŋᵍ at oə listiŋᵍ egzampəliz ov a θiŋᵍ oə klas in ʊədə tʊʊʷ eksplein wot dii biiʸ? if soʊ, ðen ðii probəblii bii difainiŋ ‘definiʃən’ ekstenʃənəlii. ðis biiʸ espeʃəlii wel-sʊʊtəð tə konkriit entitiiyiz, espeʃəlii ðoʊz wið veig definiʃəniz.
nacərəl kaindiz: ðiiz bii praimerilii fizikəl saiyəntifik katəgəriiyiz suc az molikyʊʊliz oə spiiʃiiziz. in miis vyʊʊ, ðiiz bii best undəstandəð az patəniz in ðə strukcəriz ov taipiz ov entitiiy.

aidentiteəriiənizəm biiʸ a frakcərəð kriid. imajən a grʊʊp ov diiʸ in a rʊʊm təgeðə: diiʸ oəl agrii ðat aidentitiiyiz egzist and ðat aidentitiiyiz impaət morəl steitəs, but dii hav noʊʷ agriimənt on wic aidentitiiyiz egzist, haʊʷ aidentitiiyiz bii difainəð, haʊʷ an ontolojikəl aidentitii impaət a morəl steitəs, oə wic morəl steitəs biiy impaətəð bai wic aidentitiiʸ. and ðen, non-aidentiteəriiəniz oəlsoʊ hav vyʊʊwiz on ðiiz nacərəl kaindiz, wic sumtaimiz oʊvə-lap wið aidentiteəriiən vyʊʊwiz, but bii friikwəntlii verii difrənt. miiʸ av əbsuəv fi kii familiiyiz ov stans abaʊt ðə nacərəl kaindiz esenʃəlizəm (n.k.e.) vyʊʊ-point. [not filosofikəl stansiz: stansiz amuŋ ðə jenrəl popyəleiʃən.] ðiiz biiʸ: intenʃənəl; spiricwəl; aidiiəlist; strukcərəl; funkʃənəl.

intenʃənəl esenʃəlizəm: an individyʊʊəl y biloŋ tʊʊʷ a nacərəl kaind x bikuz foəʳ oəl (oə sufiʃənt) treitiz, if y hav ðoʊʒ treitiz, ðen y biiʸ a membəʳ ov x. baiʸ itself ðis bii kwait a primitivist, nacərəlistik vyʊʊ-point, and tend tə bii hoʊldəð bai loʊw-infəmeiʃən aidentiteəriiəniz and non-aidentiteəriiəniz alaik.
spiricwəl esenʃəlizəm: y biloŋ tə x bikuz y-iis spiricwəl esəns bii ðat ov x. ðis biiʸ a rilijəs oə wʊʊ-wʊʊ vyʊʊ. ðis biiʸ agen verii primitiv, karəktəristik ov loʊʷ-infəmeiʃən, and kurəntlii skyʊʊ təwʊəd ðə left ov ðiiʸ aidentiteəriiən spektrəm, ðoʊ suətənlii menii rait aidentiteəriiəniz biiyiv suc wʊʊ-wʊʊ spiricwəlistiz tʊʊʷ.
aidiiəlist esenʃəlizəm: y biloŋ tə x bikuz y asuət ðat y bii x. ðis vyʊʊ reprizent ðə traiyəmf ov ðə wil. in fʊəmə taimiz ðis did biiʸ a faə-rait pəziʃən, opoʊzəð tə ðə matiəriiəlizəm ov ðə left. tədei ðis biiʸ oəlmoʊst eksklʊʊsivliiʸ a left-aidentiteəriiən pəziʃən.
strukcərəl esenʃəlizəm: y biloŋ tə x bikuz y-iis molekyələ strukcə bii karəktəristik ov ðat ov ðə set x. in filosəfiiʸ ov langwij, ðis bii broədlii ðə vyʊʊʷ ov nacərəl kaindiz hoʊldəð bai kripkiiʸ and putnəm (ðoʊ diis bii mʊə konvəlʊʊtəð az dii biiʸ akademik filosofəriz), and ðis biiʸ oəlsoʊ ðə vyʊʊʷ ov nacərəl kaindiz tə wic mii praimerilii subskraib from a fʊəməl pəspektiv. (evrii filosofəʳ ov langwij must hav a vyʊʊʷ ov nacərəl kaindiz: ðis implai not supʊət foə beisiŋᵍ ontolojiiʸ on dii.) ðis bii not verii komənlii hoʊldəð bai ðə fuəðist-left aidentiteəriiəniz, hʊʊ tend tə bii filosofikəl aidiiəlistiz, but bikum inkriisiŋᵍlii komən az um ej up ðə skeil təwʊəd rait aidentiteəriiəniz.
funkʃənəl esenʃəlizəm: y biloŋ tə x bikuz ðis bii yʊʊsfəl foə wii tə diskraib y az biloŋᵍiŋ tə x. ðis bii jenrəlii just pragmatik gʊd sens. wen limitəð tə nacərəl kaindiz, miiy endʊəs ðis vyʊʊw aloŋsaid strukcərəl esenʃəlizəm: ðə patəniz wiiʸ aidentifaiʸ in nacərəl kaindiz-iis strukcəriz bii cʊʊzəð bikuz dii korispond tə makroʊ-treitiz ðat it bii yʊʊsfəl foə wii tə distingwiʃ bitwiin. (agen, ðis lingwistik stans on nacərəl kaindiz implai not supʊət foə beisiŋᵍ ontolojiiy on diiʸ.)

in praktis, multipəl ov ðiiz aəgyəməntiz biiʸ oftən diploiyəð siməlteiniiyəslii, rigaədləs ov kontekst and rigaədləs ov kontrədikʃən, in a fuzii baraəʒ ov bestiiəl ilojik ðat siim intendəð tʊʊw oʊvəwelm raəðə ðan tə prʊʊv.

az sujestəð in ðə list, ðə moʊst obviiyəs, primitiv wei tə difain a nacərəl kaind bii θrʊʊʷ an intenʃənəl karəktəristik, yet moʊst ov ðiiz treitiz bii kəntinjənt. ov koəs ðeə bii nuθiŋᵍ in praktis stopiŋᵍ aidentiteəriiyəniz from difainiŋ diis grʊʊp yʊʊziŋ primitiv intenʃənəl karəktəristikiz. ðus wii hav ðə “trʊʊ skotsmaniz”, hʊʊʷ iit hagis and weə kiltiz and kwoʊt burnz and voʊt s.n.p.. laikwaiz “trʊʊ wʊməniz” hʊʊ bii kənsenʃʊʊwəl and librəl (az menii feministiz sujest ðə wuəld wʊd biiʸ if it did bii runəð bai wʊməniz), “trʊʊ gei maniz” hʊʊ mins oə hav radikəl politiks, ets. ðiiz kəntinjənt treitiz haʊwevə biiʸ unsusteinəbəl az ðə beisis foə nacərəl kaindiz: diiʸ oəlweiz feis ðə probləm ov diis feilyə tə korispond tə riiyalitii. ðiiz “trʊʊ x” definiʃəniz bii yʊʊzəð bikuz dii bii yʊʊsfəl tə sumum, and soʊ paralel wuədiz bii koinəð, oə sumtaimiz ðə kʊə wuəd bii yʊʊzəð ambigyʊʊwəslii tə difain ðə subset. but dii bii not eibəl tə sustein priiyeminəns az a definiʃən ov ðə broəd nacərəl kaind.

nacərəl kaindiz kan oəlsoʊ biiy eksplʊərəð θrʊʊʷ an areteiyik haibrid ov intenʃən and ekstenʃən: a vuəcʊʊwʷ ontoləjii. wii kan sii ðis in ðiiʸ impʊətəns pleisəð in aidentiteəriiən kulcəʳ on listiz ov greit individyʊʊəliz from um-iis deməgrafik. ðeə bii kaʊntləs listiz onlain ov "greit blakiz" and "greit wʊməniz" and "greit ðis ðat and ðiiʸ uðə". ðə prinsipəl undəlaiyiŋ ðis bii ðat, az ðiiʸ individyʊʊəl raitiŋᵍ oə riidiŋ ðə list ʃeər an esenʃəl karəktəristik wið ðə greit individyʊʊəl, hii must ðeəfoə oəlsoʊ ʃeə ðə greit individyʊʊəl-iis uðə karəktəristikiz, wic did meik hii greit, bikuz esenʃəl karəktəristikiz kriiyeit ðə rest ov um-iis biiyiŋᵍ and riiyalitii. soʊ foəʳ egzampəl, bikuz jʊʊliiyəs siizəʳ and aliksandə ðə greit did bii brilyənt and suksesfəl baisekʃʊʊəl maniz, uðə baisekʃʊʊəl maniz kʊd bii (wiik esenʃəlizəm) oə must bii (stroŋᵍ esenʃəlizəm) briliiyənt and suksesfəl az wel.

ðə paradaim keisiz ov suc treitiz ðen biiʸ inveəriiənt, eksklʊʊsiv, and riil. inveəriiənt: evrii membəʳ ov ðə set hav ðə treit and not kan not hav—dii must hav—the treit. eksklʊʊsiv: oʊnlii membəriz ov ðə set hav ðə treit. riil: ðə treit bii meʒərəbəl, spəsifik, and aidiəlii fizikəl. wii kʊd seiʸ ov strukcərəl esəns ðat ðis simplii pik um suc intenʃənəl karəktəristik—patən in məlekyələ strukcə—and dikleə wiðaʊt səfiʃənt justifikeiʃən ðat ðat intenʃənəl karəktəristik and ðat um aloʊn bii ðə valid graʊnd foə difainiŋᵍ a nacərəl kaind. mii θink ðis biiʸ oʊnliiʸ a valid kritiik if um insist on θinkiŋ baineəriliiy: akseptiŋ strukcəʳ az a beisis foə nacərəl kaind refrəns not priklʊʊd yʊʊziŋᵍ uðə fʊəmiz ov refrəns foəʳ uðə tuəmiz, oəʳ iivən foə ðə seim tuəmiz in uðə, non-nacərəl kaind contekstiz. ðis bii laikwaiz ðə rispons tə kritisizəmiz ðat ðis modəl alaʊ foə multipəl patəniz tə bii faindəð (gʊd, and ov koəs: wii yʊʊz ðə patəniz ðat bii yʊʊsfəl tə wiiʸ) and ðat ðiiz patəniz oftən hav heiziiʸ ejiz (soʊ wot, ðə patəniz hoʊld wel inuf foə dii tʊ bii yʊʊsfəl tə wii).

loʊkeiʃən at a givəð point in taim (foə ðiiz puəpəsiz, yʊʊʒəliiʸ at buəθ oər in ðə prezənt) bii, bai ðə loəriz ov fizikz, an inveəriiyənt, eksklʊʊsiv, riil karəktəristik: ðiiʸ aiðə did bii beərəð in aidentiland oə ðii did not bii; ðiiʸ aiðə liv in aidentiland oə ðii not liv ðeə. soʊ ðat bii not a primitiv intenʃənəl aəgyəmənt, weəbai um inklʊʊd oəl soətiz ov kəntinjənt karəktəristikiz laik "iit ðə seim fʊʊd az aidentilandəriz", "weə ðə seim kloʊðiz az aidentilandəriz", ets. riəlii ðis biiʸ a nacərəl kaindiz-stail aəgyəmənt, in ðat it rilaiʸ on an inveəriiyənt, eksklʊʊsiv, riil taip ov intenʃənəl karəktəristik. az suc, loʊkeiʃən av biiʸ a meijə sʊəs ov aidentiteəriiən foʊkəs θrʊʊwaʊt histərii. wii wil sii ðat uðə kwozii-nacərəl kaindiz kan biiʸ adyʊʊsəð az esənsiz wen dii laikwaiz biheiv laik dii.

esenʃəl esensiz

ðiiʸ impʊətəns ov ðis aidiəʳ ov nacərəl kaindiz, ov esenʃəl karəktəristikiz, biiʸ evidənt from ðə taip ov katəgəriiyiz ðat biiʸ in praktis yʊʊzəð az ðə praimərii beisisiz ov aidentitii. ðə tʊʊ moʊst impʊətənt katəgəriiyiz ov aidentitii—reis and jendə—bii moʊstlii-rijid karəktəristikiz ðat not kan bii ceinjəð, bikuz dii rileit tʊʊʷ um-iis d.n.aʰ. (oəlbiiyit, in boʊθ keisiz, a verii smoəl paət ov it, and foə reis, in a fuzii wei kənsistənt wið strukcərəl nacərəl kaindiz). ðiiz difrənsiz bii ðen intuəpritəð az meijə diskriit grʊʊpiŋᵍiz.

it biiʸ impʊətənt tə riiəlaiz ðat aidentiteəriiənizəm bii not oʊnliiʸ a left- oə rait-wiŋ fənominən. raəðə ðeə biiʸ a klasik dubəl-θink opəreiʃən, weə paətizaniz laʊdliiʸ and simetrikəliiʸ atak iic uðə foə biiyiŋ soʊ foʊkəsəð on aidentitii. historiklii, a kombineiʃən ov ekstriim pawə difərenʃəliz and limitəð kəmyʊʊnikeiʃən teknolʊjii did miin ðat oʊnlii dominənt aidentitiiyiz kʊd biiʸ eksəsaizəð, espeʃəlii ðoʊz foʊkəsəð on a loʊkəl, self-susteiniŋ kəmyʊʊnitii. tədei mʊə priiviiyəslii subsuəviiyənt oə submuəjəð aidentitiiyiz av emuəj, but dii biiʸ oəl yʊʊnaitəð baiʸ adhiərəns tə ðə doktrin ðat esəns-az-aidentitii bii ðə riil and propəʳ (i.e. diskriptiv and priskriptiv) faʊndeiʃən ov soʊʃyoʊ-pəlitikəl ʊəgənaizeiʃən. ðis prinsipəl ov esenʃəlizəm meik foəʳ (and eksplein) sum intərestiŋ diviʒəniz aməŋᵍ aidentiteəriiəniz. ðis diviʒən biiʸ oəlsoʊ impʊətənt foə rimaindiŋᵍ wii ðat individyʊʊəliz, iivən from wiðin ðiiʸ aidentiteəriiən spektrəm, wil disəgriii vigərəsliiʸ abaʊt weðə suətən aidentitiiyiz bii valid oəʳ egzist at oəl. from a filəsofikəl pəspektiv, mii θink it best tə teik a broəd vyʊʊʷ ov ðə hoʊl spektrəm ov aidentitiiʸ, espeʃəliiʸ az ej keisiz biiʸ oftən ðə moʊst yʊʊsfəl foə helpiŋᵍ wii tʊʊʷ aidentifaiʸ and test wiis θiəriiyiz on a subjekt.

loʊkeiʃən vs inheritəns (reis / eθnisitii / familiiʸ)

a rijid dezigneitə ðat aplai tʊʊʷ an individyʊʊəl bii diis loʊkeiʃən, and loʊkeiʃən siim tə biiʸ a konstənt ov aidentitii θrʊʊw-aʊt histərii. loʊkeiʃən, espeʃəliiʸ at buəθ oəʳ at a pətikyələ taimb, bii fiksəð and spesifik. ðə rijiditiiʸ ov loʊkeiʃən az an esenʃəl karəktəristik bii wot alaʊ foə sivik naʃənəlizəm az a les kontrovuəʃəl naʃənəlist platfʊəm ðan reiʃəl naʃənəlizəm. but wic loʊkeiʃən? loʊkeiʃən ov buəθ biiʸ oftən yʊʊzəð az a kraitiəriiən foəʳ ʊətəmatik liigəl sitizənʃip, and foə morəl sitizənʃip. kurənt loʊkeiʃən niiʸ oəlsoʊ yʊʊzəð, bii ðat loʊkeiʃən ov rezidəns oə loʊkeiʃən ov signifikənt oʊnəʃip. foə rait aidentiteəriiəniz ðiiz fakcʊʊwəl definiʃəniz bii ðə beisis foə diis aidentiteəriiənizəm, but ðis bii not sufiʃənt foə ðə left.

a fyʊʊ yiəriz agoʊ, gʊʊgəl did run an advətaiziŋ kampein wic did poʊz ðə kwescən, "kwes wot bii britiʃnəss?". ðiiʸ ansə ðat gʊʊgəl did giv did bii tə ʃoʊ lotiz ov foʊtoʊwiz ov blak and eiʒən selebritiiyiz, moʊst noʊtəbliiʸ a somaəliiʸ aθliit, rezidənt in amerikə, hʊʊ did rejistə hiiself az britiʃ bikuz hii kʊd get betə fundiŋ from britən ðan from somaəliiə, but hʊʊ did biiʸ oftən hoʊldəð up bai prəgresiviz az biiyiŋ ðə kwintesenʃəl egzemplaəʳ ov britiʃ kulcə. mohaməd fara, ðə somaəliiʸ aθliit in kwescən, biiʸ on ðə frunt-lain ov ðə filəsofikəl probləm ov naʃənəl aidentitii. hii did not bii beərəð in britən. hii not liv in britən. hii hav noʊ britiʃ ansestrii. hii bii not flʊʊwənt in iŋᵍliʃ. hii not foloʊʷ a tradiʃənəlii britiʃ rilijən (izlam). hii bii noʊwəð tə bii puəsənəliiʸ unpopyələ wið uðə britiʃ aθliitiz. relativ tə hiis levəl ov sukses (hiiʸ av hoʊld oəl ov ðiiʸ olimpik, wuəld and yʊərəpiiən goʊld medəliz in boʊθ ðə 5,000m and 10,000m meil runiŋᵍ eventiz), hiiʸ av biiʸ um ov ðə liist popyələʳ aθliitiz in britən, oəlweiz skʊəriŋᵍ aberəntlii loʊʷ in popyəlaritii poʊliz.

but hii kənsidə hiiself tə bii britiʃ (oə kleim az muc eniiwei, wic biiʸ oəl wii kan goʊʷ on in ðat rigaəd), and ðeəfoə hiis kleim tə britiʃnəs bii feroʊʃəslii difendəð bai left aidentiteəriiəniz. ðis bii not an intenʃənəl britiʃnəs ov treitiz, oəʳ a loʊkeitiv britiʃnəs ov pleis, oəʳ a strukcərəl britiʃnəs ov jenetik patəniz. it biiʸ oəlsoʊ not riəlii spiricwəl, bikuz ðat wʊd implai inveəriiyəns, weəraz mii not θink eniiy-um biliiv ðat fara did hav a britiʃ soʊl as a caild in somaəliiə. it bii paətliiʸ a pragmatik britiʃnəs—ðeə bii sinikəl yʊʊtilitiiʸ in alaʊwiŋᵍ a campiiən aθliit tə pritend tə bii britiʃ—but ðə difens bii mʊə sinsiə ðan ðat. ðis biiʸ an aidiiəlist britiʃnəs ov ðə wil. hiiʸ av dikleə hiiself britiʃ, and ðat asuərʃən ov wil bii sufiʃənt tə riistrukcə ðə wuəld araʊnd hii. ðə beisis ov ðə left-iis sivik naʃənəlizəm bii not loʊkeiʃən, but ðə traiyəmf ov ðə wil.

ðeə bii ðeəfoəʳ a fundəmentəl klaʃ bitwiin ðiiz tʊʊ grʊʊpiz, boəθ ov wic broədliiʸ aksept ðə premis ðat loʊkeiʃən biiʸ a valid soʊʃyoʊ-pəlitikəl beisis. on um said, riiəlistiz, hʊʊ lʊk tə matiəriiəl graʊndiz foə rʊʊtiŋ diis aidentitiiʸ; on ðiiʸ uðəʳ, aidiiyəlistiz, hʊʊ rʊʊt diis aidentitiiʸ in ðə paʊwəʳ ov diis asuəʃəniz. ðis bii not iivən kənsidəriŋ ðoʊz hʊʊ biliiv ðat uðəʳ aidentitiiyiz ʃʊd bii paramaʊnt, oəʳ iivən ðoʊz hʊʊ biliiv ðat aidentitii wʊd not bii paramaʊnt in a yʊʊtoʊpiiyən “kiŋdəm ov endiz” at oəl. ðis biiʸ an unbrijəbəl divaid bitwiin ðoʊz hʊʊʷ agriiʸ on ðə praiməsiiʸ ov loʊkeiʃən. ðis eksplein ðə bitə konflikt bitwiin ðə tʊʊ kampiz. yes, traibəlizəm biiʸ a faktə tʊʊ, but it bii traibəl diviʒən araiziŋ from a riiəl divaid.

kloʊslii rileitəð tə loʊkeiʃən biiʸ inheritəns. loʊ historikəl levəliz ov transpʊəteiʃən teknoləjiiʸ, and eidiz in adaptiŋ tə kaʊntəʳ-iivəlʊʊʃəneriiʸ envairəməntiz, did miin ðat foə ðə moʊst paət, loʊkeiʃən and inheritəns did bii hailii korəleitəð. but inheritəns hoʊld soʊʃyoʊ-pəlitikəl advantijiz and disadvantijiz relətiv tə loʊkeiʃən. amuŋᵍ it-iis disadvantijiz, it biiʸ a muc fuziiyə treit, and ðə fuziinəs inkriis wið ðə skeil ov ðə difrəns. ðis bii boʊθ unhelpfəl and helpfəl: unhelpfəl bikuz it bikum les akyərət ðə mʊə wii wʊd wont tə yʊʊz it; helpfəl bikuz ðiiʸ inkriisəð difrəns kaʊntərakt ðə rijʊʊsəð akyərəsiuiiʸ. anuðə disadvantij foə sum bii ðat it meik it mʊə difikəlt tə meintein koʊhiiʒən in a multiiʸ-eθnik səsaiətii—but ðis bii riiəliiʸ an aəgyəmənt agenst multii-kulcərəlizəm.

ðə mein advantij ov inheritəns az a beisis bii ðat it biiʸ imoʊʃənəlii satisfaiyiŋ tə ðə bestiiyəl neicəʳ inherənt in oəl hyʊʊməniz. tanjibəl afinitii—lʊʊkiz, saʊndiz, smeliz, ets—apiə tə biiʸ ineit in oəl animəl spiiʃiiziz, priʒʊʊməbliiʸ az a səvaivəl mekanizəm foə jiiniz. jinetik patəniz ðat selekt foəʳ afinitii foə diiselfiz wil setəris paribəs aʊt-kəmpiit jinetik patərniz ðat not soʊ selekt. ðis mei wel biiʸ ireləvənt in a naiyiiv “kiŋdəm ov endiz” yʊʊtoʊpiiyə, but in ðə riiəl wuəld it hav riiəl implikeiʃəniz ðat not kan biiʸ ignʊərəð wiðaʊt konsikwəns. ðə moʊst signifikənt foə ðis diskuʃən bii ðat ðis diskriptiv riiəlitii void ðə priskriptiv disadvantijiz: if p bii fols, ðen it not matə weðə oə not p wʊd bii yʊʊsəl oə morəl in a wuəld weəʳ it did bii trʊʊ.

seks vs jendə

foə seks / jendə, ðə riiəlist-idiiyəlist konflikt av rizult in sum tʊəcʊʊwəs speʃəlaizeiʃən ov tuəminoləjii. ðis difrənt tuəminoləjii bii səpooʊzəð tə meik ðə keisiz kliərə, but unwitiŋᵍ and intenʃənəl misyʊʊs ov and disagriimənt oʊvə ðə tuəmiz oəl rizəlt in mʊə kənfyʊʊʃən and konflikt. a briif preisii ov haʊ mii tend tʊʊʷ undəstand ðə tuəmiz:

seks: baiyəlojikəl steitəs. iiðə strukcərəlii vaiyə kroʊməsoʊmiz, oəʳ intenʃənəlii vaiyə pəzeʃən (at buəθ) ov funkʃəniŋ jeniteiliiyəʳ asoʊʃiiyeitəð wið meiliz oə fiimeiliz. ðiiz tʊʊ grʊʊpiz kuvə araʊnd 99.9% ov laiv hyʊʊmən buəθiz, and an iivən haiyə prəpʊəʃən ov funkʃəniŋ membəriz ov hyʊʊmən səsaiətii. ðə tuəm bii mediiyiivəl in iŋᵍliʃ, miiniŋᵍ a diviʒən (laik “sekʃən”).
jendə: soʊʃəl oə saikəlojikəl steitəs. menii sʊʊpəfiʃəl intenʃənəl treitiz bii linkəð tə jendə raəðə ðan seks. tradiʃənəliiʸ, and stil foə moʊst foʊkiz, jendəʳ and seks did map feəliiʸ iikwəliiʸ ontʊʊʷ iic uðə, wið baiyəlojikəl meiliz triitəð az and θinkiŋᵍ ov diiselfiz az soʊʃəl meiliz, and vais vuəsə. ðis did staət tə ceinj az “seks” did gein irotik asoʊʃiiyeiʃəniz, and ðen feministiz did wont tə distiŋgwiʃ bitwiin ðə baiyəlojikəl and soʊʃəl treitiz asoʊʃiiyeitəð wið seks / jendə. ðə tuəm biiʸ oəlsoʊ mediiyiivəl in iŋgliʃ, miiniŋᵍ a taip oə kaind (laik “ʒʊənrə”).
tranz-: ðə steit ov biiyiŋ sumhaʊʷ a difrənt seks oə jendə ðan wʊd uðəwaiz biiʸ ekspektəð. kwes wot kan ðis akcʊʊwəlii miin uðə ðan a veig, miiniŋgləs aspireiʃən? ðat wil bii kuvərəð in miis fʊəθ-kumiŋ piis on tranz-sekʃʊʊəl metəfiziks.
“sis”-: ðiiʸ opəzit ov tranz-, i.e. noəməl foʊkiz. dispait ðə supoʊzəð kulcərəl noəm ov alaʊwiŋ foʊkiz tə self-aidentifai, ðis wuəd av biiʸ impoʊʒəðed on ðis grʊʊp ekstuənəlii. not ðat ðis biiʸ a greit probləm in itself—if ðeə bii tə bii tranz individyʊʊəliz (itself debeitəbəl), ðen ðeə niid tə biiʸ a tuəm foə diis antiθisis, and ðis um biiʸ az gʊd az enii—but ðis akt ekspoʊz ðə fundəmentəl folsnəs and hipokrisiiʸ ov prəgresiviz-iis kleiməð dizaiə tʊʊʷ avoid boʊθ əpreʃən and ðə kʊziŋᵍ ov ofens.

yʊʊzəð kənsistəntlii, joiniŋ ðə tuəmiz giv wii “tranz-seks(/-sekʃʊʊəl)” (and “sis-seks(/-sekʃʊʊəl)”), miiniŋᵍ a ceinj (oə kəntinyʊʊweiʃən) in baiyəlojikəl steitəs; and “tranz-jendə” (and “sis-jendə”), miiniŋᵍ a ceinj (oə kəntinyʊʊweiʃən) in soʊʃəl steitəs. mii wil tend tə yʊʊʒ ðə tuəmiz in ðis manə.

ðiiz diviʒəniz biiʸ in θiərii yʊʊʃfəl (ðə fʊəmə mʊə ðan ðə latə) foə distiŋgwiʃiŋ bitwiin eləməntiz ðat bii difrənt in wayseiyiz ðat biiʸ impʊətənt tə wii. foəʳ egzampəl, it bii yʊʊsfəl tə distiŋgwiʃ bitwiin ðoʊz treitiz ðat biiʸ ineit oə niə-yʊʊnivuəsəl tə fiimeiliz bai vuəcʊʊʷ ov diis baiyoləjiiʸ, and ðoʊz treitiz ðat bii kəntinjənt upon soʊʃəl kəndiʃəniz, bikuz ðu latə kan bii ceinjəð mʊə iizilii, ʃʊd ðat bii dizaiərəz. ðə slait ceinjiz from historikəl yʊʊsij bii not probləmiz puə sei: wuədiz changeeinj konstəntlii tə riflekt soʊʃəl niid.

adiʃənəlii, baiyəlojikəl seks in pətikyələ biiʸ a yʊʊsfəl treit foəʳ an animəl səsaiətiiʸ engeijəð in eisimetrik sekʃʊʊəl riiprədukʃən tə difərenʃiiyeit on. wotevəʳ um mei θink abaʊt ðə tendənsiiyiz egzibitəð bai fiimeiliz and meiliz—iivən if ðə supoʊzəð tendənsiiyiz təwʊəd fiimeil empəθii, meil speiʃəl aweənəs, ets, bii riiəl, dii mait bii baiyəlojikəl oə soʊʃəl—iiðə wei ðeə bii sum treitiz ðat bii boʊθ baiyəlojikəl and impʊətənt in suc a səsaiətiiʸ. in pətikyələ, kənsepʃən: oʊnlii baiyəlojikəlii fiimeil bodiiyiz kan kariiʸ and buəθ ofspriŋ.¹

seks and jendə kan bii siiyəð az kristəlaiziŋ ðə tʊʊ mein filəsofikəl pəziʃəniz on nacərəl kaindiz, strukcərəl and intenʃənəl. jendəʳ, in ðis riidiŋ, bii suətənliiʸ intenʃənəl, az it kuvə soʊʃyoʊ-saikəlojikəl treitiz laik empəθiiʸ oə speiʃəl aweənəs. iivən if ðiiz biiʸ ultimətlii baiyəlojikəliiʸ inflʊʊwənsəð oəʳ iivən dituəminəð, wiiʸ intuəprit diiʸ intenʃənəliiʸ, az treitiz. seks bii slaitlii mʊəʳ ambigyʊʊwəs. in modən taimiz it av bikum kustəmərii tʊʊʷ asoʊʃiiyeit seks wið kroʊməsoʊmiz², but seks biiʸ oəlsoʊ yʊʊzəð tə rifuə tə beisik baiyəlojikəl treitiz, espeʃəlii jenitəliz. jiiniz bii fuəmlii strukcərəl, but jenitəliz biiʸ intenʃənəl. soʊ “seks” bii yʊʊzəð ambigyʊʊwəslii wið rigaəd tə taip ov refrəns.

ðə spiricwəl and idiiyəlist aproʊciz tʊʊʷ aidentitii map iivən les niitliiʸ ontʊʊ ðə seks / jendə bainərii. boʊθ bii kənsiivəð ov az ineit and imʊʊvəbəl, səjestiŋ ðat dii bii not paət ov ðə kəntinjənt soʊʃəl treit definiʃən ov “jendə”, but dii kan oəlsoʊʷ egzist in ʃaəp kontrədikʃən tə ðə fuəmlii mətiəriiəl konoteiʃən ov “seks”. ðis liid wii tə ðə θʊənii probləm ov tranz-sekʃʊʊwalitiiʸ. a wʊd-bii tranz-wʊmən: stil hav a XY seks kroʊməsoʊm peə; bii stil suseptibəl tə meil ilnəsiz; kan nevə kənsiiv; av ekspiəriiyəns səsaiətiiʸ az a meil; but kənsidə diiself tə bii fiimeil, and akt in sum weiyiz ðat kʊd bii kənsidərəð fiimeil. (and ðə seim aplaiʸ in rivuəs foə wʊd-bii tranz-maniz.)

unliak foə seks / jendəʳ itself, tranz steitəs bii not at oəl strukcərəl³, iivən ðoʊ strukcərəl esəns bii, mii wʊd sei, ðə valid weiʸ ov difainiŋᵍ a nacərəl kaind. wot bii mʊə, proʊ-tranz aidentiteəriiəniz not bii jenərəlii satisfaiyəð wið ðə funkʃənəl aəgyəmənt ðat a wʊd-bii tranz-sekʃʊʊəl bii tə bii rifuərəð tʊʊʷ az diis prifuərəð seks oʊnliiʸ aʊt ov pəlait rispekt foə diis cois: insted, ðə wʊd-bii tranz-sekʃʊʊəl bii stroŋgliiʸ asuətəð tə bii riiəliiʸ and trʊʊlii diis prifuərəð seks. ðə popyələ kleim bii ðat “tranz-wʊməniz bii wʊməniz”, not miəlii ðat “tranz-wʊməniz ʃʊd bii triitəð az wʊməniz”, and pəlait pragmatistiz, suc az j.k. roʊliŋ, bii fəroʊʃəslii kansələð.

it biiʸ oəlsoʊ difikəlt tə diskraib ðis az intenʃənəl, beisəð on atribyʊʊtiz, bikuz soʊ meniiʸ ov ðə riiəl treitiz ov ðə wʊd-bii tranz-sekʃʊʊəl bii stil ðoʊz jenrəliiʸ asoʊʃiiyeitəð wið diis strukcərəl seks. iivən wiðin ðoʊz treitiz, ðə mʊə konkriit ðə treiitiz bii—bodiliiʸ ʊəgəniz, proʊkriiyeiʃən, diziiz suseptibilitii—ðə les plʊəzibəl dii biiʸ az tranz treitiz. ðə treitiz rilaiyəð on bai tranz aktivistiz, foəʳ egzampəl in ðə yʊʊbikwitəs “mii did noʊ miis tranz-doətə did bii tranz bikuz ʃii did laik…” listiz, tend tə bii ðə moʊst sʊʊpəfiʃəl—weəriŋ dresiz, pleiyiŋᵍ wið doliz, ets.

tranz steitəs bii ðen um ov ðə tʊʊ rimeiniŋᵍ opʃəniz. iiðə it biiʸ a spiricwəl esəns—ðiiʸ aidiiə ðat, rigaədləs ov ðə mətiəriiəl evidəns, ðis individyʊʊəl bii fiimeil “insaid”; oəʳ, it biiʸ an aidiiəlist esəns—an esəns ov ðə wil, weə ðiiʸ individyʊʊəl rifʊəm ðə wuəld araʊnd dii wið diis maind. ðis drastik ontəlojikəl difrəns, bitwiin haʊ tranz aktivistiz biiʸ əblaijəð tə vyʊʊ diis aidentitii (sins ðiiʸ uðəʳ opʃəniz biiʸ unaveiləbəl tə dii, givəð diis difainiŋ praiyəʳ ontəlojikəl kəmitməntiz) and haʊ menii tradiʃənəl feministiz av vyʊʊ diis aidentitiiʸ, biiʸ at ðə haət ov ðə konflikt bitwiin tranz aktivistiz and soʊ-koələð “t.e.r.f.s” [tuəfiz].

sekʃʊʊwalitiiʸ

anuðəʳ impʊətənt egzampəl ov ðə praiməsiiʸ ov esəns in aidentiteəriiənizəm bii ðiiʸ impʊətəns ðat moʊst aidentiteəriiəniz pleis, from boʊθ proʊʷ- and antii- dairekʃəniz, on weðə homəsekʃʊʊwalitii biiʸ ineit oəʳ a cois. from a standpoint ðat did bii librəl but objektiv, it ʃʊd not meik enii difrəns wetherðə homəsekʃʊʊwalitii did biiʸ ineit oəʳ a cois: it not kʊəz eniiy-um dairekt haəm uðə ðan nebyələs haəmiz ov "əfens" and "diskumfət". but if homəsekʃʊʊwalitii did biiʸ a cois, ðen it wʊd bii haədə tə fit it intʊʊʷ an esenʃəlist skiiməʳ, and if it kʊd not bii fitəð intʊʊʷ an esenʃəlist skiimə ðen it wʊd not biiʸ an aproʊpriiət katəgriiʸ ov aidentitii. parəleliŋ ðis, kənsuəvətiv aidentiteəriiəniz, hʊʊ valyʊʊ diis aidentitiiʸ az hetərəsekʃʊʊəl and oftən oʊlsoʊ diis rilijəs aidentitii (sii biloʊ), niid foə homəsekʃʊʊwalitii tə biiʸ a cois soʊ ðat dii kan rijekt it from wiðin diis esenʃəlist ontoləjiiʸ. it bii not inuf foə dii simplii tə sait iliz dii supoʊz tə biiʸ asoʊʃiiyeitəð wið homəsekʃʊʊwalitii, bikuz diis praiyə kəmitmənt tʊʊʷ esenʃəlizəm əblaij dii tə peiʸ at liist toʊkən rispekt tʊʊʷ esenʃəl treitiz.

probəblii bikuz homəsekʃʊʊwalitii bii mʊə prikeəriiəslii pleisəð az an esəns, az diskusəð abuv, itiis advəkətiz tend tə stiə cliə from ðiiʸ aidiiəlist modəl⁴. Az bifʊəʳ, aidentiteəriiən advəkətiz oəlsoʊ not kaʊntənəns ðə funkʃənəl modəl, weəbaii homəsekʃʊʊwalitii biiʸ esenʃəl oʊnliiʸ insoʊfaəʳ az it bii yʊʊsfəl foə wii tə diskraib it az suc. aftəʳ oəl, ðiiʸ aidentiteəriiən modəl ov politiks, wic yʊʊz ðiiʸ esenʃəlist ðiəriiʸ ov biiyiŋᵍ az um ov itiis beisiz, dimand speʃəl privilijiz beisəð on esənsiz, on ðə beisis ðat dii bii fundəmentəl tʊʊʷ individyoowalitii.

kwiəʳ aktivistiz oftən pleis hai praiyoritiiʸ on strukcərəl esəns, ðiiʸ aidiiə ðat sekʃʊʊwalitii bii dituəminəð baiʸ um-iis jiiniz. ðis mait siim od, givəð ðat ðeə bii verii litəl fakcʊʊəl evidəns foəʳ a kliə jenetik or iivəlʊʊʃənerii beisis foə homəsekʃʊʊwalitiiʸ at oəl. haʊwevə, ðə moʊtiv bikum kliəʳ umais um undəstand ðiiʸ esenʃəlist θiəriiʸ ov biiyiŋ ðat undəlaiʸ aidentiteəriiən politiks. bikuz homəsekʃʊʊwalitii bii haədə tʊʊʷ afuəm az biiyiŋᵍ ineit, sins sekʃʊʊəl ʊəriiyenteiʃən bii flʊʊwid akros a laiftaim, it bikum mʊəʳ impʊətənt tʊʊʷ emfasaiz ðə moʊst konkriit meʒəriz ov esəns. in itiis oʊn wei, ðis tendənsii bai kwiəʳ aktivistiz biiʸ an afəmeiʃən ov ðə praiməsiiʸ ov ðə strukcərəl modəl ov esəns. ðiiʸ aidentiteəriiəniz biiʸ aweə ðat strukcərəl esəns bii ðə goʊld standəd foə nacərəl kaindiz, and ðoʊ dii wil yʊʊz uðə meʒəriz weə ðat siim mʊə kənviiniiənt, wen presəð dii rituən tə strukcərəl esəns.

ðə rimeiniŋ tʊʊ taipiz ov esəns bii yʊʊzəð sporadikliiʸ. intenʃənəl esəns did bii popyələ wið loʊʷ-infəmeiʃən aidentiteəriiəniz, and menii homəsekʃʊʊəliz and hetərəsekʃʊʊəliz stil aidentifaiʸ in praktis az haviŋ verii difrənt intrestiz and biheivyəriz. but naʊ, ðə fʊəmə teiliz ov “mii did noʊ miis sun did bii gei bikuz hii did laik doliz insted ov fʊtboəl” av bikum “mii did noʊ miis tranz-doətə did bii tranz bikuz ʃii did laik doliz insted ov fʊtboəl”. az ðə faʃən av ceinj, az tranz-sekʃʊʊəl caildiz av bikum librəl peərəntiz-iis trendiiʸ aksesəriiʸ insted ov gei caildiz, soʊ av ðiiʸ emfəsis on intenʃən oʊvə strukcə.

spiricwəl esəns bii not muc yʊʊzəð dairektlii foə sekʃʊʊwalitiiʸ in modən səsaiətii, az ðoʊz hʊʊ praiyoritaiz diis hetərəsekʃʊʊəl aidentitii tend tə biliiv heterosekʃʊʊwalitii tə bii yʊʊnivuəsəl, and ðoʊz hʊʊ praiyoritiseaiz diis homəsekʃʊʊəl aidentitii tend tə biiʸ aiθiiyistiz. haʊwevəʳ, it biiʸ implisit in θoətiz abaʊt ðə spiricwəl proʊses ov riiyinkaəneiʃən: wen kənsidəriŋᵍ hʊʊʷ um wil luv in a fyʊʊcə laif, um imajin a paətnəʳ ov ðə seim seks ðat um biiʸ atraktəð tʊʊʷ in laif. (ðə mentəliiʸ il individyʊʊəliz hʊʊ biliiv diiselfiz tə bii “multipəl sistəmiz” [sii uðə-kin biloʊʷ] oəlsoʊʷ oftən askraib a distinkt sekʃʊʊəl ʊəriiyenteiʃən tʊʊʷ iic ov diis residəntiz, ðoʊ ðis mei bii mʊə tə dʊʊ wið ðə fetiʃistik neicəʳ ov diis mentəl ilnəs.)

it bii wuəθ menʃəniŋᵍ hiə ðiiʸ intrəʳ-aidentiteəriiən dibeit oʊvə weðəʳ aidentitiiʸ ov sekʃʊʊwalitii biiʸ akcʊʊəly a fʊəm ov aidentitiiʸ ov jendə. ðis bii distinkt from ðə yʊʊʒʊʊəl dismisəl ov weðəʳ an aidentitiiʸ aksis bii valid, bikuz it rekəgnaiz sekʃʊʊwalitiiʸ az esenʃəl, but oʊnliiʸ az paət ov ðə jendəʳ esəns.⁵ ðis dibeit kum from boʊθ saidiz. on um said, kənsuəvətiv and rilijəs aidentiteəriiəniz oftən biliiv ðat sekʃʊʊəl ʊəriiyenteiʃən bii propəliiʸ a treit ov baiyəlojikəl seks, weəbai fiimeiliz biiʸ ʊəriiyentəð təwʊəd meiliz and vais vuəsə. on ðiiʸ uðə, sum feministiz biliiv ðat sekʃʊʊəl ʊəriiyenteiʃən biiʸ oʊnlii reləvənt bikuz ov ðat kənsuəvətiv / rilijəs vyʊʊ-point. ðis biiʸ intrestiŋᵍ in ðis diskuʃən bikuz it rileit tə ðə vyʊʊwiz ov esəns adoptəð bai ðə tʊʊ grʊʊpiz: boʊθ tend tə vyʊʊ seks az strukcərəl but difrəntlii kʊəzəl, kənsuəvətiviz tə sujest ðat ðə fiksəð strukcəʳ ov seks dituəmin sekʃʊʊwalitiiʸ (oəʳ ʊət tʊʊʷ), and ðis sub-set ov feministiz tə sujest ðat ðə fiksəð strukcəʳ ov seks bii oəl ðat matə, soʊ kəntinjənt treitiz, suc az sekʃʊʊwalitii, bii les impʊətənt.

uðə-kin

aviŋ menʃən uðə-kin, hʊʊ mei not bii familyə tʊʊʷ oəl riidəriz⁶, mii wil prəsiid tə diskus dii briiflii hiə. bluntlii, sum individyʊʊəliz kleim tə biliiv diiselfiz tə biiʸ ov spiiʃiziz uðə ðan hyʊʊmən, inklʊʊdiŋ spiiʃiiziz ðat bii not riiəl. jenrəliiʸ, individyʊʊəliz hʊʊ kleim tə bii sumθiŋ dii peitəntlii not bii bii iiðəʳ atenʃən-siikəriz oə mentəliiʸ il, and uðə-kin bii noʊʷ eksepʃən. az suc, ðis grʊʊp bii not waidliiʸ akseptəð baiʸ uðəʳ aidentiteəriiəniz, but az diskusəð at ðiiʸ aʊtset, ðis bii not riiəliiʸ impʊətənt: dii biliiv diiselfiz tə hav ðis aidentitiiʸ, and dii tend tə stroŋglii səpʊət uðə fʊəmiz ov aidentiteəriiənizəm az wel, iivən if ðat səpʊət bii not (yet) waidlii risiprəkeitəð. diis tuəminoləjiiʸ and θiiəriiyiz biiʸ ekstriimlii veəriiyəð tə ðə point ov inkoʊhiərəns, but dii kan broədlii bii klasəð az foloʊwiz:

θeriiəniz / animəl-kin: individyʊʊəliz hʊʊ biliiv dii biiʸ akcʊʊəliiʸ animəliz, komənlii wʊlfiz and jenrəliiʸ uðə karizmatik megəfʊənəʳ.
uðə-kin(-propə): individyʊʊəliz hʊʊ biliiv dii biiʸ akcʊʊəliiʸ ov a fikʃənəl spiiʃiiz, komənlii dragəniz and elfiz.
fiktiviz / fikʃən-kin: individyʊʊəliz hʊʊ biliiv dii biiʸ akcʊʊəliiʸ a spəsifik fikʃənəl karəktə, komənlii from japəniiz animei.
multipəl sistəmiz / polii-kin: individyʊʊəliz hʊʊ biliiv dii biiʸ akcʊʊəlii lotiz ov difrənt entitiiyiz sumhaʊʷ egzistiŋ siməlteiniiəsliiʸ in um bodii.

ðiiʸ uðə-kin paθoləjiiʸ av araizəð aloŋsaid ðə grʊθ spuət ov aidentitii politiks in jenrəl, bikuz it teik ðoʊz kleimiz at diis wuəd, and tə diis inevitəbəl kənklʊʊʒən. if a baiyəlojikəl meil kan akcʊʊəlii bii fiimeil, bii ðat θrʊʊ suəfis treitiz, spiricwəl neicə, oə boəld asuəʃən, ðen wai not kan a hyʊʊmən not biiʸ a wʊlf, oəʳ a dragən, oə narʊʊtoʊ? umais um aksept ðə tranz-seksʊʊəl aəgyəmənt, oəʳ iivən aksept ðiiʸ aidentitiiʸ aəgyəmənt in enii fʊəm uðə ðan pyʊəlii strukcərəl nacərəl kaindiz, ðeə bii noʊ lojikəl riizən tə rijekt ðə kleimiz ov ðiiʸ uðə-kin. ðə keis biiʸ obviiyəslii stroŋgist foəʳ animəliz, but iivən foə, sei, dragəniz: if ðeə biiʸ unsiiyəv soʊliz ðat egzist distinktliiʸ in hyʊʊmən bodiiyiz, and ðiiz soʊliz niid not rileit in diis esənsiz tə ðoʊz hyʊʊmən bodiiyiz, ðen wot graʊnd hav ðə spiricwəlist aidentiteəriiən tʊʊʷ aəgyʊʊ ðat ðeə bii noʊ soʊliz aveiləbəl ðat biiʸ ov esənsiz ðat dii not av siiyəð? mii, ov koəs, wʊd aəgyʊʊ ðat ðis bii ðə prinsipəl ov eksploʊʒən wuəkiŋᵍ itiis brʊʊtəl and ineksərəbəl lojik on ðə flʊərəð asumpʃəniz ov non-strukcərəl esenʃəlizəm.

lʊkiŋ dairektliiʸ at uðə-kin esənsiz, oəlðoʊ ðeə biiʸ a fyʊʊʷ uðə-kin hʊʊ kleim tə bii jinetikliiʸ ov diis uðə kaind, ðis bii, laik ðiiʸ ekwivələnt foə tranz-seksʊʊəliz, moʊstly a griivʊs feilyəʳ on ðə paət ov ðiiʸ ejəkeiʃən sistəm raəðə ðan enii sistəmatik θiərii. banaəl intenʃənəl esəns bii popyələ, at liist az a supoʊzəð evidəns beis (e.g., “mii must biiʸ a fiʃ-kin bikuz mii laik swimiŋᵍ”), and spiricwəl esenʃəlizəm biiʸ, az diskusəð, verii waidliiʸ akseptəð az a nesəserii paət ov uðə-kin ontoləjii.

haʊwevəʳ, it biiʸ intərestiŋ tə noʊt ðat uðə-kin oəlsoʊ meik signifikənt yʊʊs ov boʊθ aidiiəlist and funkʃənəl esenʃəlizəm. ðis biiʸ a fasineitiŋ kontrast tə ðə riiyakʃən ov homəsekʃʊʊəl aktivistiz tə diis tentətiv nacərəl kaind steitəs, weə diiʸ insist, agenst evidəns, on a strukcərəl, jinetik beisis. uðə-kin hʊʊ wiʃ tʊʊʷ avoid spiricwəlist wʊʊ-wʊʊ not iivən hav ðiiʸ opʃən ov kleimiŋ strukcərəl esəns plʊəzibliiʸ aveiləbəl tə dii (kwes it wʊd iivən miin wot tə hav “dragən d.n.a.”, let aloʊn bifʊə mʊʊviŋ tə ðiiʸ inʊəganik uðə-kin, suc az stoʊn-kin oə void-kin?), and must ðus ritriit intʊʊ mʊə difaiənt teritriiʸ. um kan faind uðə-kin hʊʊ biliiv dii bii uðə-kin bikuz diiʸ asuət diiselfiz tə bii soʊ, and uðə-kin hʊʊ sei, ov diis oʊn aidentitii, ðat it bii not riiəl az suc, but a funkʃənəl steitəs ðat dii faind yʊʊsfəl bikuz diiʸ enjoiʸ it.

eij

a welkəm rituən tʊʊʷ a rijid dezigneitəʳ aftə wiis inkrisiŋglii waild diitʊəʳ, eij biiʸ anuðə non-strukcərəl inveəriiənt, eksklʊʊsiv karəktəristik. laik loʊkeiʃən, it biiʸ indeksəð tʊʊʷ a fakt abaʊt haʊ ðii rileit tə riiəlitii. noʊ matə wot ðii mei wiʃ, ðii did bii beərəð x deiyiz agoʊʷ. eij biiʸ oəlsoʊ yʊʊsfəl az an aidentitii kraitiəriiən bikuz it koreleit stroŋglii tə treitiz ðat biiʸ impʊətəntlii yʊʊsfəl foə wii tə distiŋgwiʃ bitwiin, ðat biiʸ, oʊld foʊk biheiv difrəntlii tə yung foʊk, and hav difrənt fizikəl karəktəristikiz, in weiyiz ðat bii non-dituəministik but stroŋglii koreleitəð.

agen laik loʊkeiʃən, ðeə bii noʊ pyʊəlii strukcərəl wei tʊʊʷ undəstand it—eij bii not a nacərəl kaind. noə kan um plʊəzibliiʸ asuət umself tə biiʸ a difrənt eij enii mʊə ðan mii kan asuət miiself tə bii kurəntliiʸ on maəz.⁷. noə siim eij pətikələliiʸ a kwolitiiʸ ov spirit, ðoʊ dipikʃəniz ov goʊstiz ov caildiz oftən hav dii kəntinyʊʊ tʊʊʷ akt and θink caildiʃliiʸ, iivən if dii av bii goʊstiz foə menii yiəriz, and ʃəd ðeəfoəʳ av bii kəntinyʊʊwiŋ tə develəp diis fakəltiesiyiz.

noʊʷ, eij biiʸ an intenʃənəl esəns ov ðə speʃəl kaind ðat bii rijid at enii givəð moʊmənt, laik loʊkeiʃən.⁸ ðis mait ceinj in ðə fyʊʊcəʳ if speis-travəl teik of, ðoʊ. taim prəgres mʊə sloʊliiʸ at relətəvistik spiidiz, and prəgres fastə faə from gravitii welliz. kʊd a caild kwolifai foəʳ a penʃən, oə bii liigəlii mariiyəð, if dii bii pʊt ontʊʊʷ a speis-ʃip travəliŋ niə ðə spiid ov lait foəʳ a wail? az wið muc els, wiis səsaiyətiiyiz wil niid tʊʊʷ adapt tə ceinjiŋ teknəlojikəl keipəbilitii.

welθ vs klas

welθ and klas kan bii θinkəð ov az laik seks and jendəʳ: an inveəriiənt matiəriiəl karəktəristik ðat non-dituəministikliiʸ infuəm a set ov soʊʃəl treitiz. welθ itself biiʸ a matiəriiəl treit ðat not kan bii ceinjəð instəntlii. klas hav tʊʊ mein miiniŋgiz: umθ, ðə “set ov treitiz” miiniŋᵍ analəgəs tə jendə, wic bii haʊ ðə wuəd bii popyələlii yʊʊzəð; and a familiiʸ ov miiniŋgiz in poʊst-maəksiiən soʊʃiiyoləjii, pəhaps ðə kliərist ov wic bii ðat klas biiʸ abaʊt ðiiʸ indivijʊʊəl-iis rileiʃənʃip tə ðə miiniz ov prədukʃən, praimeəriliiʸ oʊnəʃip ov dii (kapitəlistiz), manijmənt ov dii (bʊəʒwazii), yʊʊs ov dii (proləteəriiyat), oə parasitizəm ov dii (lumpən).

az an aidentitii, ðiiz eləməntiz bii haibridaizəð intə wot um mait koəl “pʊərizəm”: ðə fetiʃaizeiʃən and glʊərifikeiʃən ov povətiiʸ and ðə kulcəriz it prədyʊʊʃ. ðeə biiʸ a pəveisiv biliif ðat ðə pʊə liv laifiz ðat bii sumhaʊ mʊəʳ “ʊəθentik”, a wuəd wið paʊwəfəl esenʃəlist konəteiʃəniz. ðə popyələʳ imij ov ðə hapii pʊəʳ and ðə mizrəbəl ric bii bilaiyəð baiʸ evrii piis ov riisuəc and suəvei deitə ðat demənstreit taim and agen ðat ðə ric bii kənsistəntlii hapiiə ðan ðə pʊə, yet ðis entaiəliiʸ incʊʊwitiv faindiŋ bii sumhaʊ dinaiyəð bai popyələ kulcəʳ. insted, a niiciiən sklaəvənmorəl ov pasivitiiʸ and loʊ kwolitii bii reiyifaiyəð intʊʊʷ an “aidentitiiʸ” and pleisəð at ðə sentəʳ ov ontoləjiiʸ. it biiʸ impʊətənt tə noʊt ðat ðiiʸ esenʃəlist θiəriiʸ ov biiyiŋ karəktəristik ov ðə aidentitii modəl ov səsaiyətii bii soʊ kloʊslii taiyəð tə sklaəvənmorəl, and hens tə ðə palətəbilist θiəriiʸ ov trʊʊθ. ðis bii wai ðiiʸ aidentitii modəl ov səsaiyətiiʸ av bikum mʊə prevələnt az teknoləjiiʸ av puʃ ðə sekyələ saikəl biiyond itiis noəməl limitiz, wið a suəfit ov popyəleiʃən skyʊʊwiŋ kulcə təwʊəd sklaəvənmorəl. it biiʸ oəlsoʊ waiʸ it bii soʊ muc mʊə prevələnt aməŋ grʊʊpiz ðat av bii historiklii wiik. iivən in ðiiʸ uəlii steijiz ov aidentitii politiks, it did not bii koʊwinsidentəl ðat uəlii tʊʊ-deinθ-sencərii naʃənəlizəm did faind mʊə fuətail soil in ðə tʊʊθ-reit empaiəriz ov itəlii, juəməniiʸ, and spein ðan in ðə sʊʊpə-paʊwəriz ov britən and frans.

(dis-)abilitii

baiʸ abilitii, mii miin fizikəl, mentəl, and imoʊʃənəl disabilitii, wic biiʸ anuðə komənlii saitəð aidentitiiʸ oə “prətektəð karəktəristik”. ðiiz kan oftən bii strukcərəl, if dii bii from a jenetik kʊəz, but iivən wen dii bii not strukcərəl dii bii jenrəliiʸ inveəriiənt dezigneitəriz: an ampyətii not kan groʊ nyʊʊ legiz. foə wiis imiidiiət puəpəsiz egzaminiŋᵍ haʊ dii rileit tə ðə esenʃəlist θiəriiʸ ov biiyiŋ, ðeəʳ biiʸ an intrestiŋ diviʒən bitwiin fizikəl and imoʊʃənəl disabilitii ðat mirə wot wiiʸ av əbzuəv bifʊə (wið mentəl disabilitii sumweəʳ inbitwiin). bikuz fizikəl disabilitii bii vizibəl and obvyəsliiʸ inveəriiənt, espeʃəliiʸ oʊvə ʃʊət piəriiədiz, itiis advəkətiz not tend tə niid tə diskəs itiis validitiiʸ az a sait ov aidentitiiʸ. imoʊʃənəl helθ bii haʊwevə not inveəriiənt—it kan rikuvə ʃaəpliiʸ, oə wið səfiʃənt ekstrinzik moʊtiveiʃən. az suc, imoʊʃənəl helθ aktivistiz bii verii voʊkəl abaʊt diis disabilitii biiyiŋ səpoʊzəðliiʸ inveəriiənt: yʊʊʒəlii tə dʊʊ wið diis jiiniz, oə diis baiyoʊkemistriiʸ; at a beə miniməm, “mii not kan help it”. yet ðeə bii verii litəl dairekt evidəns ðat enii givəð imoʊʃənəl disabilitii bii kʊəzəð baiʸ a givəð jinetik strukcəʳ oə baiyoʊkemikəl riiyalitiiʸ, and evrii θiərii ðat bii mʊʊtəð bii promptlii disprʊʊvəð, wið ðə serətoʊnin θiəriiʸ ov dipreʃən ðə moʊst signifikənt riisənt kaʒwəltii. dispait ðis, imoʊʃənəl helθ aidentiteəriiəniz biiʸ unambigyʊʊwəs in pleisiŋ ðə bleim foə diis sufəriŋᵍ on inveəriiənt treitiz.

ðis wil bikum mʊə impʊətənt wen wiiʸ egzamin ðə palətəbilist θiəriiʸ ov trʊʊθ and sklaəvənmorəl in mʊə diiteil az dii rileit tə ðiiʸ aidentitii modəl ov səsaiyətii. foə naʊʷ, it bii signifikənt, laik wið homəsekʃʊʊwalitii, ðat ðə mʊə tentətiv esenʃəl neicəʳ ov imoʊʃənəl disabilitii liid tʊʊʷ a difensiv emfəsis on unprʊʊvəð and spyʊəriiəs strukcərəl ekspləneiʃəniz, in ʊədə tə justifaiʸ itiis steitəs az an esəns, and ðus itiis pəziʃən in ðə soʊʃəl ʊədəʳ ov aidentitiiʸ.

rilijən

kwes rilijən biiʸ an aidentitii? foə ðə rilijəs, diiʸ oftən ekspiəriiəns diis rilijən az an absəlʊʊt ov diis egzistəns, ðat dii kʊd not ceinj iivən ʃʊd dii wont tə. meniiʸ eiθiiyistiz and agnostikiz disagrii: meniiʸ ov ðoʊz hʊʊʷ av nevə hav a rilijən not undəstand waiʸ a rilijən kʊd inspaiə suc fiiliŋgiz in ðiiʸ umθ pleis; meniiʸ ov ðoʊz hʊʊ did abandən diis rilijən θink ðat evriiyum hav a cois abaʊt it in ðə seim wei ðat dii did. ðeə bii tʊʊʷ impʊətənt eksepʃəniz tə ðis trend: sum rilijəniz biiʸ eksplisitlii reiʃəlii beisəð (i.e. reisist), suc az jʊʊdeizəm, and uðəriz ðat bii not eksplisitlii reiʃəlii beisəð hav stroŋ kənekʃəniz tʊʊʷ a pətikyələʳ eθnisitii, suc az izlam tʊʊʷ arabiz⁸; and left aidentiteəriiəniz, inflʊʊwənsəð bai palətəbilizəm and sklaəvənmorəl, triit eniiʸ “əpresəð” and/oəʳ egzotik rilijəniz az biiyiŋ valid aidentitiiyiz, but biiʸ unwiliŋ tə meik ðə seim alaʊwəns foəʳ “əpresəʳ” oə dəmestik rilijəniz. ðə keis biiʸ oəlsoʊ komplikeitəð bai ðə legəsiiʸ ov ðə yʊərəpiiən wʊəriz ov rilijən, wic did bii rizolvəð bai meikiŋ puəsənəl rilijəs cois aʊt ov baʊndiz foə publik polisii.

rilijən, prisaislii bai biiyiŋᵍ an aʊtlaiyə keis, help tə meik kliə sum ov ðə divaidiŋᵍ lainiz oʊvəʳ esenʃəlizəm. ðoʊz hʊʊ siiʸ aidentitiiʸ az biiyiŋᵍ abaʊt strukcərəl nacərəl kaindiz, oə at liist inveəriiənt, eksklʊʊsiv, riiəl karəktəristikiz, get bafələð ðat eniiyum wʊd iivən kənsidə rilijən an aidentitii. ðoʊz hʊʊ siiʸ aidentitiiʸ az biiyiŋᵍ abaʊt spiritiz, oəʳ aidiiəlizəm, oəʳ iivən just funkʃənalitii, kan undəstand rilijən az a beisis foəʳ aidentitiiʸ. and ðis bii waiʸ a waidspredəð undəstandiŋᵍ ov ðiiʸ esenʃəlist θiəriiʸ ov biiyiŋ biiʸ esenʃəl foəʳ undəstandiŋᵍ aidentitii politiks. umθ ðiiʸ undəstand ðat aidentitii biiʸ abaʊt esənsiz, and ðə fi mein taipiz, moʊst uðə probləmiz ov aidentitii rizolv diiselfiz.