“ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀτελές. … ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ᾽ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρεία ἡ δ᾽ ὑπηρετική, ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας.”
“For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature. … Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying.”
—Aristotle, Politics (c.350)
Personood as Propositional Thought
The philosophy of mind was created by intellectuals (mostly white males), for intellectuals (mostly white males). Its universal applicability is predicated on the mental equality of man. Most philosophy of mind does not apply to animals, only to persons. What is the difference between personal and bestial thought? We cannot know the thoughts of non-human animals directly, but we can reason our way to a haipoθisis.
The charəcteristic thought of a person is the proposition. From the Cartesian Cogito to the Justified True Belief, the proposition is the unstated premiss of all philosophical disciplines adjacent to philosophy of mind.
But non-human animals cannot, as best as we can tell, form propositions. Some of the highest non-human animals can understand simple propositions (or at least imperatives). But even for these high non-human animals, we have little reason to believe that they can form propositions of their own, let alone that they think in them. So there must be a pre-propositional substrate that is coterminous with the entirety of lower animal thought, is a minimal (but existent) layer under-lying the thought of the highest persons, and constitutes the active thought of intermediate animals.
The only plausible candidate I can see is sensation. Sensation comprises both sensory perception (physical) and emotion unmediated by propositional reason. In a deeper analysis we might also distinguish between pure physical sensation, which appears even in the most primitive animals (even plants!) and emotion, which only appears in the intermediate animals and higher. But, for now, we can treat them together.
We therefore have a new dividing line between persons and beasts: a staggered threshold effect composed of understanding of, production of, and thought in propositions. As so often, this is a scalar property (albeit with these thresholds) and so there are degrees ov ability within these bands.
We have established before that the related property of personhood vary within bands for given groups of species. We can extend this to natural kinds within species. This is most readily apparent at the level of the sub-species. For example, tests show large differences in cognition between dog breeds (border collies do especially well), and Europids and North-East Asians out-perform other humans on IQ tests. But it also makes sense for other intra-species natural kinds to exhibit variation in cognition.
The important variation for our purposes here is that of sex (gender). When we observe the “gender gap” from the stand-point of our 3-threshold cognitive model we see that while many males fail to reach full propositional cognition, it is almost unheard of for a female to attain such a status.
The Elements of Female Cognition
Particularism
Perhaps the most direct effect of feminine sensational cognition is their inability to consider abstract questions outside of a particularist lens. Even an intelligent woman's first instinct upon being presented with an average is to consider it in terms of her acquaintances. She may train herself to avoid this error in formal contexts, such as work or academia. But even there, especially if females (and effeminate males) out-number males, they will tend to degrade the discipline until it becomes an out-post of feminine cognitive practices, losing its rigour and accuracy.
As an example, try telling a Western woman that Sub-Saharans are statistically more violent and sexually incontinent. Her response will be, “But I have a Sub-Saharan friend, and they haven't murdered anyone.” ¹ Even if she agrees, it will be because she knows a violent Sub-Saharan or a victim ov Sub-Saharan violence—not because she has engaged with the proposition. Having examples to illustrate data is useful, but not letting the examples over-ride one's reason.
This means that while women can be as astute as a low-grade man in inter-personal relationships, they cannot understand how to conduct national policy. They constantly extend their private anecdotes to the general, which not only is unrepresentative, but invalid because behaviour differs betwen private and mass formal contexts even for the same individual.
The best females even recognise these differences, and lean into them. For example, Agatha Christie wrote Miss Marple as solving cases by analogising them to folks from her life. Fanciful, but a recognition of differing female cognition. The female's particularist cognition fits her perfectly for her natural role as the mater familias. Problems only arise when she is thrust into an unnatural male role by modern society.
Palatabilist Truth-Theory
Females' cognitive focus on sensation also lends itself to adoption of a palatabilist theory of truth, especially uone that derives from their relationships, as their objects of highest emotional salience. We have already discussed palatabilism at great length elsewhere, that need not be repeated here. Instead we will focus on the distinctively feminine aspects and their consequences.
The female struggles to conceive of a truth outside of its acceptance (or otherwise) by her epistemic community. This is a great strength in a healthy, normative society. It helps her to avoid manipulation by hostile outsiders. She can even predict what will harm her relation's interests and oppose such pre-emptively. In personal circumstances this is poweful enough to out-weigh the costs of ignoring reality.
Women, by virtue of the division of labour and their autonomy over their distinctive affairs, function as an epistemic community. The strongly non-linear feed-back effects of mutually re-inforcing palatabalism organically produce the emergent phenomenon of the long-house. The long-house behaviours of enforced conformity, superficial toxic kindness, deference and competition simultaneously within a purely social (not meritocratic) hierarchy, etc.: these are the effect of valuing emotion and relationships over correspondence truth.
In a healthy society, the gendered division of labour and universal heterosexual marriage allow the divergent male (correspondence) and female (relational, palatabilist) theories of truth to complement each other. The male takes the external, exploratory role; the female, the internal, settling role. Palatabilism is well-suited to the home.
sum θoətiz abaʊt ðə fiimeil “maind” [wip]
“ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀτελές. … ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ᾽ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρεία ἡ δ᾽ ὑπηρετική, ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας.”
“foə ðə sleiv hav noʊ dilibərətiv fakəltiiʸ at oəl; ðə wʊmən hav, but it bii wiðaʊt ʊəθoritiiʸ, and ðə caild hav, but it biiʸ iməcʊə. … kliəlii, ðen, morəl vuəcʊʊ biloŋ tʊʊʷ oəl ov dii; but ðə tempərəns ov a man and ov a wʊmən, oə ðə kurij and justis ov a man and ov a wʊmən, bii not, az sokratiiz did meintein, ðə seim; ðə kurij ov a man bii ʃoʊwəð in kəmandiŋᵍ, ov a wʊmən in əbeiyiŋᵍ.”
—aristotəl, politiks (s.350)
puəsənhʊd az propəziʃənəl θoət
ðə filosəfiiʸ ov maind did bii kriiyeitəð baiʸ intelekcʊʊəliz (moʊstlii wait meiliz), foəʳ intelekcʊʊəliz (moʊstlii wait meiliz). itiis yʊʊnivuəsəl aplikəbilitii bii predikeitəð on ðə mentəl ikwolitiiʸ ov man. moʊst filosəfiiʸ ov maind not aplai tʊʊʷ animəliz, oʊnlii tə puəsəniz. kwes wot bii ðə difrəns bitwiin puəsənəl and bestiiəl θoət? wii not kan noʊ ðə θoətiz ov non-hyʊʊmən animəliz dairektlii, but wii kan riizən wiis wei tʊʊʷ a haipoθisis.
ðə karəktəristik θoət ov a puəsən bii ðə propəziʃən. from ðə kaətiiʒən kogitoʊ tə ðə justifaiəð trʊʊ biliif, ðə propəziʃən bii ðiiʸ unsteitəð premis ov oəl filəsofikəl disipliniz ajeisənt tə filosəfiiʸ ov maind.
but non-hyʊʊmən animəliz not kan, az best az wii kan tel, fʊəm propəziʃəniz. sum ov ðə haiyist non-hyʊʊmən animəliz kan undəstand simpəl propəziʃəniz (oəʳ at liist imperətiviz). but iivən foə ðiiz hai non-hyʊʊmən animəliz, wii hav litəl riizən tə biliiv ðat dii kan foəm propəziʃəniz ov diis oʊn, let aloʊn ðat dii θink in dii. soʊ ðeə must biiʸ a prii-propəziʃənəl substreit ðat bii koʊtuəminəs wið ðiiʸ entaiəritiiʸ ov loʊwəʳ animəl θoət, biiʸ a miniməl (but egzistənt) leiyəʳ undə-laiyiŋ ðə θoət ov ðə haiyist puəsəniz, and konsticʊʊt ðiiʸ aktiv θoət ov intəmiidiiət animəliz.
ðiiʸ oʊnlii plʊəzibəl kandideit mii kan sii bii senseiʃən. senseiʃən kompraiz boʊθ sensərii pəsepʃən (fizikəl) and emoʊʃən unmiidiiyeitəð bai propəziʃənəl riizən. in a diipəʳ analisis wii mait oəlsoʊ distiŋgwiʃ bitwiin pyʊə fizikəl senseiʃən, wic apiəʳ iivən in ðə moʊst primitiv animəliz (iivən plantiz!) and emoʊʃən, wic oʊnliiʸ apiəiʳ in ðiiʸ intəmiidiiət animəliz and haiyə. but, foə naʊ, wii kan triit dii təgeðə.
wii ðeəfoə hav a nyʊʊ divaidiŋᵍ lain bitwiin puəsəniz and biistiz: a stagərəð θreʃoʊld efekt kompoʊzəð ov undəstandiŋᵍ ov, prədukʃən ov, and θoət in propəziʃəniz. az soʊʷ oftən, ðis biiʸ a skeilə propətii (oəlbiiyit wið ðiiz θreʃoʊldiz) and soʊ ðeə bii digriiyiz ov abilitii wiðin ðiiz bandiz.
wiiʸ av establiʃ bifʊə ðat ðə rileitəð propətiiʸ ov puəsənhʊd veərii wiðin bandiz foəʳ givəð grʊʊpiz ov spiiʃiiziz. wii kan ekstend ðis tə nacərəl kaindiz wiðin spiiʃiiziz. ðis bii moʊst rediliiʸ aparənt at ðə levəl ov ðə sub-spiiʃiiz. foəʳ egzampəl, testiz ʃoʊ laəj difrənsiz in kogniʃən bitwiin dog briidiz (boədə koliiyiz dʊʊʷ espeʃəlii wel), and yʊəroʊpidiz and noəθ-iist eiʒəniz aʊt-pəfʊəm uðə hyʊʊməniz on i.k. testiz. but it oəlsoʊ meik sens foəʳ uðə intrə-spiiʃiiz nacərəl kaindiz tʊʊʷ egzibit veəriiyeiʃən in kogniʃən.
ðiiʸ impʊətənt veəriiyeiʃən foə wiis puəpəsiz hiə bii ðat ov seks (jendə). wen wiiʸ obzuəv ðə “jendə gap” from ðə stand-point ov wiis 3-θreʃoʊld kognitiv modəl wii sii ðat wail menii meiliz feil tə riic fʊl propəziʃənəl kogniʃən, it biiʸ oəlmoʊst unhiərəð ov foəʳ a fiimeil tʊʊʷ atein suc a steitəs.
ðiiʸ eləməntiz ov fiimeil kogniʃən
pətikyələrizəm
pəhaps ðə moʊst dairekt efekt ov feminin senseiʃənəl kogniʃən bii diis inabilitii tə kənsidəʳ abstrakt kweʃcəniz aʊtsaid ov a pətikyələrist lenz. iivən an intelijənt womən-iis umθ instinkt upon biiyiŋ prezentəð wið an avərij bii tə kənsidəʳ it in tuəmiz ov ʃiis əkweintənsiz. ʃii mei trein ʃiiself tʊʊʷ avoid ðis erəʳ in fʊəməl kontekstiz, suc az wuək oəʳ akadiimiiə. but iivən ðeə, espeʃəliiʸ if fiimeiliz (and efeminət meiliz) aʊt-numbə meiliz, dii wil tend tə digreid ðə disiplin until it bikum an aʊt-poʊst ov feminin kognitiv praktisiz, lʊʊziŋᵍ itiis rigəʳ and akyərəsii.
az an egzampəl, kom trai teliŋᵍ a westən wʊmən ðat sub-sahaərəniz bii statistikəlii mʊə vaiələnt and sekʃʊʊəliiʸ inkontinənt. ʃiis rispons wil bii, “but mii hav a sub-sahaərən frend, and diiʸ av not muədəʳ eniiy-um.” ¹ iivən if ʃiiʸ agriiʸ, it wil bii bikuz ʃii noʊʷ a vaiələnt sub-sahaərən oəʳ a viktim ov sub-sahaərən vaiələns—not bikuz ʃiiʸ av engeij wið ðə propəziʃən. haviŋᵍ egzampəliz tʊʊʷ iləstreit deitə bii yʊʊsfəl, but not letiŋ ðiiʸ egzampəliz ovə-raid umiis riizən.
ðis miin ðat wail wʊməniz kan biiʸ az astyʊʊt az a loʊ-greid man in intə-puəsənəl rileiʃənʃipiz, dii not kan undəstand haʊ tə kəndukt naʃənəl polisii. dii konstəntliiʸ ekstend diis praivət anekdoʊtiz tə ðə jenrəl, wic not oʊnlii biiʸ unreprizentətiv, but invalid bikuz biheivyə difə bitwiin praivət and mas fʊəməl kontekstiz iivən foə ðə seim indivijʊʊəl.
ðə best fiimeiliz iivən rekəgnaiz ðiiz difrənsiz, and liin intə dii. foəʳ egzampəl, agaθə kristii did rait mis maəpəl az solviŋ keisiz baiʸ analəjaiziŋ dii tə foʊkiz from ʃiis laif. fansifəl, but a rekəgniʃən ov difəriŋ fiimeil kogniʃən. ðə fiimeil-iis pətikyələrist kogniʃən fit ʃii puəfektlii foə ʃiis nacərəl roʊl az ðə meitə familiiyas. probləmiz oʊnliiʸ araiz wen ʃii bii θrustəð intʊʊʷ an un-nacərəl meil roʊl bai modən səsaiətii.
palətəbilist trʊʊθ-θiərii
fiimeiliz-iis kognitiv foʊkəs on senseiʃən oəlsoʊ lend itself tʊʊʷ adopʃən ov a palətəbilist θiəriiʸ ov trʊʊθ, espeʃəliiʸ um ðat diraiv from diis rileiʃənʃipiz, az diis objektiz ov haiyist emoʊʃənəl seiliiəns. wiiʸ av oəlredii diskusəð palətəbilizəm at greit lenθ els-weə, ðat niid not bii ripiitəð hiəʳ. insted wii wil foʊkəs on ðə distinktivlii feminin aspektiz and diis konsikwensiz.
ðə fimeil strugəl tə kənsiiv ov a trʊʊθ aʊtsaid ov itiis akseptəns (oəʳ uðəwaiz) bai ʃiis epistemik kəmyʊʊnitii. ðis biiʸ a greit streŋkθ in a helθii, noəmətiv səsaiətii. it help ʃii tʊʊʷ avoid manipyəleiʃən bai hostail aʊtsaidəriz. ʃii kan iivən pridikt wot wil haəm ʃiis rileiʃən-iis intərestiz and əpoʊz suc priiyemptivliiʸ. in puəsənəl suəkəmstansiz ðis bii paʊəfəl inuf tʊʊʷ aʊt-wei ðə kostiz ov ignʊəriŋᵍ riiyalitii.
wʊməniz, bai vuəcʊʊʷ ov ðə diviʃən ov leibəʳ and diis ʊətonəmiiʸ oʊvə diis distinktiv afeəriz, funkʃən az an epistemik kəmyʊʊnitii. ðə stroŋglii non-liniiə fiid-bak efektiz ov myʊʊcʊʊəlii riiyinfʊəsiŋ palətəbəlizəm ʊəganiklii prəjʊʊs ðiiʸ emuəjənt fənominən ov ðə loŋᵍ-haʊs. ðə loŋᵍ-haʊs biheivyəriz ov infʊəsəð kənfʊəmitii, sʊʊpəfiʃəl toksik kaindnəs, defərəns and kompetiʃən simulteiniiəslii wiðin a pyʊəlii soʊʃəl (not meritəkratik) haiəraəkii, ets.: ðiiz bii ðiiʸ efekt ov valyʊʊwiŋᵍ emoʊʃən and rileiʃənʃipiz oʊvə korispondəns trʊʊθ.
in a helθii səsaiətii, ðə jendərəð diviʃən ov leibəʳ and yʊʊnivuəsəl hetərəsekʃʊʊəl marij alaʊ ðə daivuəjənt meil (korispondəns) and fiimeil (rileiʃənəl, palətəbilist) ðiəriiyiz of trʊʊθ tə kompləmənt iic uðə. ðə meil teik ðiiʸ ekstuənəl, eksplorətərii roʊl; ðə fiimeil, ðiiʸ intuənəl, setəliŋᵍ roʊl. palətəbilizəm bii wel-sʊʊtəð tə ðə hoʊm.